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The Global Financial Crisis and Proposed
Regulatory Reform
Randall D. Guynn
The U.S. real estate bubble that popped in 2007 launched a sort
of impersonal chevauchée1 that randomly destroyed trillions of dollars
of value for nearly a year. It culminated in a worldwide financial
panic during September and October of 2008.2 The most serious
recession since the Great Depression followed.3 Central banks and
governments throughout the world responded by flooding the
markets with money and other liquidity, reducing interest rates,
nationalizing or providing extraordinary assistance to major financial
institutions, increasing government spending, and taking other
creative steps to provide financial assistance to the markets.4 Only
recently have markets begun to stabilize, but they remain fragile, like
a man balancing on one leg.5
The United States and other governments have responded to the
financial crisis by proposing the broadest set of regulatory reforms

 Partner and Head of the Financial Institutions Group, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP,
New York, New York. © 2009, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP. I am deeply indebted to Pengyu
Jeff He, Reena Agrawal Sahni, and Cristina Diaz Fong for their excellent assistance in
preparing this Article. This Article covers developments announced prior to October 9, 2009.
This Article is the result of research done in preparation for a presentation at the Annual
International Conference, Dubai Economic Forum, Oct. 27–28, 2009.
1. A chevauchée is a type of raid used by medieval armies to spread terror among
civilian populations and turn them against their governments by randomly burning and
plundering rich and thickly populated towns and countryside. See DESMOND SEWARD, THE
HUNDRED YEARS WAR 38 (1978).
2. Kevin Warsh, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Address at the
Council of Institutional Investors 2009 Spring Meeting: The Panic of 2008 (Apr. 6, 2009),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/warsh20090406a .htm.
3. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Address at the 2009 Commencement
of the Boston College School of Law (May 22, 2009), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090522a.htm.
4. Steven M. Davidoff & David T. Zaring, Big Deal: The Government’s Response to the
Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463 (2009); Gary Dorsch, After Shocks from the October
Financial Markets Crash, MARKET ORACLE, Nov. 7, 2008, http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/
Article7166 .html.
5. I am indebted to Gary Crittenden, former Chief Financial Officer of Citigroup, for
this metaphor.
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since the 1930s.6 There is widespread belief that the financial crisis
was caused by the free markets being too free. If we had better
government regulation and supervision, and more of it, according to
this way of thinking, we could have avoided the financial crisis and
would prevent future crises from ever happening again.7 These
beliefs may or may not be correct, but governments are moving
ahead as if they were. Heaven help anyone who stands in their way!8
This Article tries to identify who or what caused the financial
crisis, how the crisis spread, how bad it is likely to become, and
whether things are likely to become better or worse. It then discusses
the U.S. and international government programs that were designed
or implemented to arrest the crisis. Finally, it discusses the U.S. and
international regulatory proposals designed to prevent future crises,
or at least reduce their likelihood or severity.
I. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
The global financial crisis has been characterized by an
unexpected collapse of asset values; extreme uncertainty, fear, and
pessimism about future asset values; a severe contraction of credit
and risk-taking; rising unemployment; and a shrinkage in general
economic output. Hundreds of banks have failed or been bailed out,
and hundreds more will fail before the crisis is over. Trillions of
dollars of asset values have been wiped out. Fortunes have been lost.
Some families have lost their homes. Unemployment has soared.
6. Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on 21st Century Financial Regulatory
Reform (June 17, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
Remarks-of-the-President-on-Regulatory-Reform (“[M]y administration is proposing a
sweeping overhaul of the financial regulatory system, a transformation on a scale not seen since
the reforms that followed the Great Depression.”).
7. See, e.g., Helene Cooper & Charlie Savage, A Bit of ‘I Told You So’ Outside World
Bank Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2008, at A14 (“Year after year of unregulated free-market
economics have finally come home to roost.”) (citations omitted); What’s Worse Than a Flawed
Bailout?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, at A26 (“[T]he free market in finance, unregulated and
unsupervised, has failed.”).
8. At least one member of the U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC),
which was established by Congress to investigate the causes of the financial crisis and report to
Congress by December 15, 2010, has urged Congress to wait until the FCIC has finished
identifying and analyzing the causes before it passes legislation to address the crisis. See Brian
Burnsed, Financial Crisis: Time For More Study, or Action?, BUS. WK., Sept. 17, 2009,
available
at
http://www.businessweek.com/blogs/money_politics/archives/2009/09/
financial_crisi.html. The FCIC is modeled on the Pecora Commission, which performed a
similar function in the United States in the 1930s. See LAWRENCE WHITE, THE CRISIS IN
AMERICAN BANKING 97–100 (1995).
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Ponzi schemes have been exposed. Economic output has slowed or
even shrunk.
The first signs of the financial crisis appeared in 2007, when U.S.
real estate prices began to collapse and early delinquencies in recently
underwritten subprime mortgages began to spike. Some investors
started shorting real estate markets.9 The leveraged credit market
dried up and billions of dollars of pending buy-out deals collapsed.
Billions more in mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) were written down. Several
CEOs of major U.S. financial institutions lost their jobs.10 Others
saved their jobs by obtaining capital infusions from sovereign wealth
funds, hedge funds, private equity funds, and other pools of risk
capital.
The carnage quickly spread to Europe, where real estate prices
also started to collapse, and many financial institutions had large
exposures to both U.S. and European real estate investments.11 Real
estate prices continued to collapse in early 2008, resulting in billions
of dollars of additional CDO markdowns, the collapse and rescue of
Northern Rock and Bear Stearns, and extraordinary measures by the
Federal Reserve to de-stigmatize the discount window for
commercial banks and make emergency liquidity facilities available to
the large investment banks.12 As the Federal Reserve responded to
the crisis by reducing interest rates and flooding the market with
money, the value of the dollar plummeted relative to other
currencies.13 By the summer of 2008, the price of oil, agricultural
products, and other commodities—which are generally denominated

9. Vikas Bajaj & Edmund L. Andrews, Broader Losses from U.S. Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 24, 2007, at A1.
10. Martha Graybow, American Chief Executives Face Tenuous Times, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
9, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/09/business/worldbusiness/
09iht-exec.1.9096108.html.
11. The impact of the financial crisis on Asia has been more indirect—a drop in demand
for Asian exports from the United States and Europe; losses by Asian sovereign wealth funds
and governments on their investments in U.S. and European financial institutions; the sale by
some U.S. and European financial institutions of their minority investments in the large
Chinese banks; and a drop in the market capitalization of listed Asian companies.
12. Landon Thomas, Jr. & Matthew Saltmarsh, European Regulators Move Swiftly to
Rescue Two Lenders, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, at C2.
13. Jack Healy, As Dollars Pile Up, Uneasy Traders Lower Currency’s Value, N.Y. TIMES,
May 22, 2009, at B1.
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in U.S. dollars—soared almost in inverse proportion to any declines
in the dollar.14
The interbank credit markets seized up. The market value of
U.S. and European financial institutions, especially U.S. mortgage
giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,15 collapsed throughout the
summer, putting increasing pressure on banking regulators
throughout the world. The U.S. government was particularly
concerned about Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac because of their size
and importance to the U.S. housing market. On June 30, 2008,
these two institutions had combined liabilities of over $5.5 trillion,
on a combined total regulatory capital base of approximately $100
billion.16 Moreover, there was a widespread perception that their
obligations were backed by an implicit guarantee from the U.S.
government. The U.S. Treasury asked Congress for a blank check—
the power to inject unlimited amounts of additional capital into
Fannie and Freddie—arguing that if the market knew that Treasury
had a “bazooka” instead of a “squirt gun,” it was substantially less
likely that Treasury would be required to provide any financial
assistance at all. Congress gave Treasury that authority on July 30,
2008.17
The market value of Fannie and Freddie, however, continued to
collapse throughout August.18 The government determined that
14. Adam Schreck, Soaring Crude Pushes Gas Closer to $4, WASH. POST, May 20, 2008,
at D02.
15. Fannie Mae is a U.S. government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) formally known as
the Federal National Mortgage Association. Freddie Mac is a U.S. GSE formally known as the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. Their mission is to help provide liquidity to the
U.S. residential market by purchasing or guaranteeing payment on certain residential
mortgages. See FannieMae.com, About Fannie Mae, http://www.fanniemae.com/
kb/index?page=home&c=aboutus (last visited Feb. 13, 2010); FreddieMac.com, Our Mission,
http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/company_profile/our_mission/ (last visited Feb. 13,
2010).
16. See Fannie Mae, Quarterly Report for the Quarter Ended June 30, 2008 (Form 10Q)
(Aug.
8,
2008),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
310522/000095013308002717/w58421e10vq.htm; Freddie Mac, Quarterly Report for the
Quarter Ended June 30, 2008 (Form 10-Q) (Aug. 6, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1026214/000102621408000026/f58905e10vq.
htm.
17. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat.
2654 (2008).
18. Stephen Bernard & Alan Zibel, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Shares Plummet, Real
Clear
Markets,
Aug.
21,
2008,
http://www.realclearmarkets.com/news/ap/
finance_business/2008/Aug/21/fannie_mae__freddie_mac_shares_plummet.html (last visited
Feb. 13, 2010).
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many of their assets needed to be written down, and concluded that
they would not be able to plug the hole by raising additional capital
from the capital markets. Alarmed that fear of a failure of Fannie or
Freddie could pull down the rest of the financial system, the U.S.
Treasury decided to exercise its new “bazooka” authority on
September 6, 2008—approximately five weeks after receiving it—
concluding that such action would calm the financial markets. The
government put Fannie and Freddie into conservatorship and
pledged to inject up to $200 billion of new capital in the form of
senior preferred stock and warrants.19 The terms of the transaction
resulted in an immediate dilution of 80% of common shareholder
value, and a sharp drop in the value of junior preferred stock. The
value of Fannie’s and Freddie’s senior and subordinated debt,
however, soared because it was senior to the government’s
investment.
Rather than calming the markets, the “rescue” of Fannie and
Freddie may have added fuel to the worldwide financial panic that
continued throughout September and October. In any event, on the
following weekend Lehman Brothers and AIG collapsed, and Merrill
Lynch was bought at a fire-sale price by Bank of America.20 The
Federal Reserve exercised its emergency powers under Section 13(3)
of the Federal Reserve Act to rescue AIG, but the government
allowed Lehman Brothers to fail.21 The terms of the AIG rescue were
similar to Fannie and Freddie—the government received senior
preferred stock and warrants, resulting in an immediate dilution of
80% of common shareholder value, and a sharp drop in the value of
junior preferred stock.22 But the value of AIG’s senior and
subordinated debt soared, and the counterparties on its credit default
swaps and other financial contracts were made whole.
After the AIG collapse, the U.S. Treasury asked Congress for
express authority to invest up to $700 billion in toxic mortgage and
19. Dawn Kopecki, Lockhart’s Fannie, Freddie Guarantee Remarks Stir Up Confusion,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 23, 2008, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20670001&sid=ajIEoZCommlk.
20. Charlie Gasparino, Bank of America to Buy Merrill Lynch for $50 Billion, CNBC,
Sept. 14, 2008, http://www.cnbc.com/id/26708319/.
21. See Craig Torres & Scott Lanman, Fed Eschews Markets, Picks Winners and Losers in
AIG, Lehman, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 17, 2008, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=ahHI4BgK8VI0&refer=home.
22. Nanette Byrnes, AIG’s Uphill Battle, BUS. WK., Feb. 26, 2009, available at http://
www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/feb2009/db20090225_499189. htm.
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other assets in order to clean up the balance sheets of the U.S.
financial sector.23 While Treasury’s request for what was later called
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was pending before
Congress, Washington Mutual (the largest thrift in the United
States) failed and was sold to JP Morgan; Wachovia was rescued by
Citigroup and then Wells Fargo; Fortis and Dexia were nationalized
by the Dutch, Belgian and French governments; Ireland announced
a program to recapitalize its banking system; and the Icelandic
banking system collapsed and a large portion of its assets were seized
by the U.K. government.24 Commodity prices, which had spiked
during the summer as the dollar fell, reversed course and began to
fall as the market began to fear a worldwide depression more than a
weakened U.S. dollar.25
The House rejected TARP on September 30, 2008, resulting in
the largest one-day drop in the Dow Jones Industrial Average of 778
points, or $1.3 trillion in market value. The Senate quickly passed a
bill during the first week of October, the House reconsidered its
action, and President Bush signed the bill into law on the same day
the House approved it.26
During the second week in October, the United Kingdom
announced the terms of its rescue program for the Royal Bank of
Scotland Group and Lloyds-HBOS, two of the largest banks in the
world, which were on the brink of collapse.27 The U.S. Treasury also
announced its Capital Purchase Program (CPP), which involved
making investments of up to $250 billion in the preferred stock of
U.S. insured depository institutions and their holding companies.28
The U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
temporarily increased deposit insurance coverage to $250,000 per

23. Mark Thompson, 7 Questions About the $700 Billion Bailout, TIME.COM, Sept. 24,
2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1843941,00.html.
24. Chris Dolmetsch, Subprime Collapse to Global Financial Meltdown: Timeline,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 13, 2008 available at http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=20601208&sid=aleqkSjAAw10.
25. John Wilen, Dollar’s Fall Stokes Spike in Oil, Gas Prices, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 13,
2008, at C3.
26. Jay Newton, What the Bailout-Bill Crisis Has Wrought, TIME.COM, Oct. 3, 2008,
available at http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1847205,00.html.
27. Ross Kerber, Citizens Bank Parent to Be Part of British Rescue, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 9, 2008, at E1.
28. Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Fighting the Financial Crisis, One Challenge at a Time, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2008, at A27.

426

DO NOT DELETE

421

4/26/2010 8:05 PM

The Global Financial Crisis

person per institution, as well as announcing the creation of the
Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, which would provide
credit support to debt capital market issuances and non-interest
bearing transaction accounts.29
Week three in October resulted in a $54 billion rescue of UBS
by the Swiss National Bank, and the creation of a €500 billion rescue
program by Germany to support its banking sector.30 The next
several weeks saw a stampede of U.S. financial institutions seeking to
acquire insured depository institutions in the United States in order
to qualify for CPP money. The U.S. government announced an
additional $20 billion in capital support and a related $301 billion
asset guarantee program for Citigroup in late November.31 The U.S.
government announced a similar program of extraordinary support
for Bank of America in early 2009 to facilitate its acquisition of
Merrill Lynch, which continued to hemorrhage value between
signing and closing.32 Similar failures, rescues, and financial assistance
programs were announced throughout 2009 after the genuine panic
receded. For a timeline of these financial crisis events, see Annex A,
which is borrowed from The Davis Polk Financial Crisis Manual.33
It will be many years before the definitive account is written on
the central cause or causes of the financial crisis. But several people
have offered theories. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has
identified global imbalances in savings rates and cash flows as the
root cause.34 Former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan has stressed the
29. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Temporary Guarantee Program Frequently
Asked Questions (Nov. 16, 2009), http://www.fdic.gov/ regulations/resources/TLGP/
faq.html.
30. Nelson D. Schwartz, UBS Gets Bailout, and Credit Suisse Will Seek New Capital,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/ 10/16/business/
worldbusiness/16iht-sbanks.4.17023713.html.
31. Sarah Jones, Europe Stocks Rise on Citigroup Rescue; Deutsche Bank, BHP Gain,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 24, 2008, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aXSCLxGmWpuk.
32. Daniel Kruger, Fed Says Merrill Lynch Is No Longer Primary Dealer (Update 1),
BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 11, 2009, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601087&sid=aVWzNaO9CD9M&refer=home.
33. THE DAVIS POLK FINANCIAL CRISIS MANUAL: A GUIDE TO THE LAWS,
REGULATIONS AND CONTRACTS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009) [hereinafter DPFCM],
available
at
http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/d1ab7627-e45d-4d35-b6f1ef356ba686f2/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/2a31cab4-3682-420e-926f-054c72e
3149d/fcm.pdf.
34. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at Morehouse College:
Four Questions About the Financial Crisis (Apr. 14, 2009), available at
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same global imbalances, which he characterized as “excessive” saving
in China and oil producing countries, and huge investments of such
savings in U.S. assets, as well as the surprising failure of the free
market system to self-correct.35 Paul Volcker, the Fed Chairman
before Alan Greenspan, emphasized the repeal of Glass-Steagall as
one of the principal causes.36 Lord Turner identified macroeconomic
trends, excessive consumer and business leverage, misplaced reliance
on mathematical models, and pro-cyclical policies as among the chief
causes of the financial crisis.37 French finance minister Christine
Lagarde points to the decision by U.S. authorities to allow Lehman
Brothers to fail as a key reason why the financial crisis became so
severe.38 The de Larosière Group emphasized the U.S. factors that
contributed to causing the financial crisis, including low-interest rate
policies and the creation of complex securitization products that
financial institutions did not understand.39 Others see rating agencies
and mark-to-model accounting for assets with no ready market as
creating a pernicious feedback loop that caused excessive markdowns of illiquid assets. Still others blame weak risk management
and a failure to make tough decisions during boom years.
Some have blamed mortgage brokers for deceiving consumers
into taking risks they could not afford by offering them complex
mortgage loans with teaser rates and flexible payment options that

http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090414a.htm.
35. See, e.g., ALAN GREENSPAN, THE AGE OF TURBULENCE: ADVENTURES IN A NEW
WORLD (2007); Alan Greenspan, The Fed Didn’t Cause the Housing Bubble, WALL ST. J., Mar.
11, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123672965066989281.html;
Testimony of Alan Greenspan Before the Committee of Government Oversight and Reform
(Oct. 23, 2008), available at http://oversight.house.govdocuments/20081023100438.pdf.
36. See Statement of Paul Volcker Before the House Financial Services Committee
(Sept.
24,
2009),
available
at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/
financialsvcs_dem/volcker.pdf; Matthew Benjamin and Christine Hopper, Volcker Urges
Dividing Investment, Commercial Banks (Update 1), BLOOMBERG, Mar. 6, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=atSsZ5Fp8xuY&refer=home.
37. See FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY
RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL BANKING CRISIS (Mar. 2009), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf.
38. Tamora Vidaillet & Veronique Tison, Letting Lehman Go Was Big Mistake: French
Finmin, REUTERS, Oct. 8, 2008, (Patrick Graham ed.) http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSTRE49735Z20081008.
39. THE DE LAROSIÈRE GROUP, THE HIGH-LEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL
SUPERVISION IN THE EU (Feb. 25, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_ en.pdf.
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the consumers could not understand.40 Others say that subprime and
other borrowers, seeing the opportunity to use the real estate bubble
to their advantage, rolled the dice and are now simply disappointed
that their gamble did not pay off.41 Still others blame government
policies that encouraged investors to take excessive risk by giving
them reason to believe that some financial institutions—like
mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—were “too big or
complex to fail.”42 Still others blame executive compensation policies
that do not require senior managers to internalize the costs of
excessive risk-taking.43 Still others blame a combination of
government policies and inherent market failures.44
Many regulators and other policymakers, such as U.S. Treasury
Secretary Tim Geithner, stress the lack of adequate regulatory or
supervisory powers—especially the failure of any single regulator to
have adequate power to gather information about or regulate the
“financial system” as a whole—the existence of regulatory arbitrage,
the lack of resolution authority over systemically important financial
institutions, and the lack of power to regulate over-the-counter
40. See, e.g., Letter from Barney Frank, Congressman, 4th Cong. Dist. of Mass., U.S.
Cong. to Constituents About the Causes of the Economic Crisis (Oct. 11, 2008), available at
http://www.house.gov/frank/docs/2008/08-11-08-economic-crisis-letter.html;
Barney
Frank, Congressman, 4th Cong. Dist. of Mass., U.S. Cong., Speech to U.S. House of
Representatives: The Great Economic Hole (Apr. 2, 2009), available at
http://www.house.gov/frank/speeches/ 2009/04-02-09-great-economic-hole.html.
41. See, e.g., David Reilly, Mortgage Bombs, Quiet for Now, Await Next Boom,
BLOOMBERG.COM, June 24, 2009, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=asCPzYMnjbE4; Kathleen Pender, Why We Shouldn’t Be
Bailing out Subprime Lenders or Borrowers, SFGATE.COM, Apr. 22, 2007, available at http://
articles.sfgate.com/2007-04-22/business/17241101_1_subprime-mess-bail-conventionalmortgage; Eli Leher & George Benston, Subprime Borrowers: Not Innocents, BLOOMBERG
BUS. WK., 2008, available at http://www.businessweek.com/debateroom/archives/
2008/01/subprime_borrow.html.
42. See, e.g., Peter Wallison, Congress Is the Real Systemic Risk, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17,
2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123725470200650641.html; Peter J.
Wallison, Arthur F. Burns Fellow in Fin. Pol’y Studies, Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Pol’y & Res.,
Testimony Before the House Financial Services Committee (Mar. 17, 2009), available at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/wallison031709.pdf.
43. See, e.g., Gene Sperling, Couns. to the Sec’y of the Treasury, U.S. Dept. of the
Treasury, Testimony Before the House Financial Services Committee (June 11, 2009),
available
at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/sperling.pdf;
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Dir. of the Corp. Governance Program, Harvard Law School, Written
Testimony Before the House Financial Services Committee (Jan. 22, 2010), available at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/bebchuk.pdf.
44. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND
THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009).
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derivatives.45 Others say the regulators had all the power they
needed, but failed to exercise it because they did not see the financial
crisis coming. Others blame pro-cyclical capital, reserving or markto-market accounting policies, or the lack of adequate capital,
liquidity and leverage requirements.
Although the final word on who or what caused the financial
crisis has not been written, this financial crisis has followed a similar
pattern that almost every other mania, panic, and crash has followed
before this one. Some combination of cheap credit and excessive
optimism creates a bubble in asset prices, typically in real estate or
commodities. Eventually this bubble pops, resulting in a collapse in
asset prices, a spike in interest rates, extreme uncertainty about
“true” asset values, and excessive pessimism. This pattern has been
described in great detail in Charles Kindleberger’s classic work,
Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises.46
It is a movie we have seen over and over again, at least since the
1600s, including the rise and collapse of tulip prices in 1637 and the
European banking crisis that followed; the collapse of the South Sea
bubble of 1720, which resulted in a U.K. banking crisis and claimed
many personal fortunes, including that of Sir Isaac Newton; the
Banking Panic of 1837, which wiped out a large number of banks
throughout the United States; the Banking Panic of 1907, where J.
Pierpont Morgan single-handedly restored confidence in the U.S.
markets; the Roaring Twenties, 1929 Crash and the Great
Depression of the 1930s; the U.S. savings and loan crisis of the late
1980s and early 1990s; and the global financial crisis of 2007–2009.
In all of these cases, the prototypical pattern repeated itself, although
with differences in each one.47
The recent global financial crisis was triggered by a collapse in
U.S. real estate prices at a time when U.S. households, corporations,
and financial institutions had built up huge levels of debt leverage.
The first signs of the collapse appeared in the early delinquency rates
of subprime mortgages underwritten in 2005, 2006, and 2007. This

45. See U.S. TREASURY, A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION
REGULATION (June 17, 2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/
docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf.
46. Charles KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL
CRISES (2005); see also CARMEN REINHART & KENNETH ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT:
EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL Folly (2009).
47. See KINDLEBERGER, supra note 46, at 8–20.
AND
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led to increasing stress in the markets, a spike in interbank interest
rates, the panic that occurred in September and October of 2008,
and the recession in economic output that followed.48
Global macroeconomic factors certainly contributed to the shape
and fury of this financial crisis. Excess savings in rapidly developing
countries, such as China and oil-exporting countries, were invested
in the debt of industrialized nations, driving down interest rates
there. Cheap exports from developing countries (especially China
and India) kept inflation low.49 Increased productivity from the
computer and information technology revolution also kept inflation
low.50 U.S. housing and monetary policy, Fannie and Freddie, and
securitization also kept mortgage interest rates low. These conditions
produced excessive optimism, talk of a “new paradigm” for
economic growth and productivity, and cheap credit.51 This in turn
produced a real estate bubble in the United States and Europe, and a
spike in consumer debt and financial institution leverage. Increased
demand from developing countries also contributed to bubbles in
commodities prices.
The global financial crisis spread through the financial sector first
as these crises always do.52 Banks and other financial institutions are
characterized by high leverage, illiquid long-term assets, and
extremely short-term liabilities (e.g., demand deposits). These
characteristics make banks and other financial institutions susceptible
to “runs on the bank.”53 A run on a bank (or other financial
institution) will result in a sudden and unexpected death spiral that is
difficult to predict or arrest. Financial institutions are different from
widget companies, which typically slide slowly into bankruptcy.
History shows that financial institutions almost always fail suddenly
and unexpectedly. This time it was no different. And Main Street
immediately aligned against Wall Street.
The rational response of a financial institution to the threat of a
run on the bank makes things worse. The rational response is to

48. See POSNER, supra note 44, at 253.
49. Id. at 37–39.
50. See STEPHAN KUDYBA AND ROMESH DIWAN, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY,
CORPORATE PRODUCTIVITY, AND THE NEW ECONOMY 8–10 (2002).
51. Id. at 4–8.
52. ELLEN D. RUSSELL, NEW DEAL BANKING REFORMS AND KEYNESIAN WELFARE
STATE CAPITALISM 34 (2006).
53. Id.
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circle the wagons, increase capital and cash reserves, reduce the
amount of credit extended, and otherwise reduce the institution’s
leverage. Because of a sort of inverse money multiplier effect, this
type of response produces a severe contraction of credit throughout
the system. This hurts everyone, the financial institution itself, other
financial institutions, widget companies, and consumers. It is a
negative externality like air pollution.
To illustrate how the money multiplier magnifies the expansion
and contraction of credit throughout the system, consider the
following example. Assuming a 10 fractional reserve requirement,
every $100 of whatever monetary base (e.g., central bank money) is
deposited into the banking system will multiply by 10 times into
$1,000 of credit throughout the system ($100 * 1/0.10) when
there is strong public confidence in the system. This can be called
the triumph of the money multiplier in strong economies. The
tragedy of the money multiplier during a financial crisis can be
illustrated by the following modification of the example above. If
banks are required or choose to circle the wagons during a financial
crisis, so that fractional reserves grow from 10% to 20%, the money
multiplier will amplify the contraction of credit. The amount of
credit available in the system will shrink by 50% or more (i.e., $500),
not by only 10% or $100. Available statistics show that the money
multiplier fell from about 10 times in 2007 to less than 5 times by
2009,54 resulting in a 50% or greater contraction in available money
and credit.
Several factors made this financial crisis worse than it might
otherwise have been. For example, the very instruments that helped
manage credit risk, reduce the cost of credit and increase the
availability of credit during normal times before the financial crisis
made the crisis more violent. I am talking about mortgage-backed
securities (MBS), collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), CDOsquared, collateralized securities lending programs, and credit default
swaps.55 Excessive confidence about financial models, as well as the
failure of credit rating agencies to update their credit rating models
as circumstances changed, also contributed to the existence and

54. See The Disappearing Money Multiplier,
http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/
2009/01/disappearing-money-multiplier.html (Jan. 5, 2009).
55. See Floyd Norris, Credit Crisis? Just Wait for a Replay, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2007,
at C1.
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depth of the crisis.56 Mark-to-model accounting rules, applied to
assets with no ready market value, as well as the SEC’s resistance to
counter-cyclical loan loss reserves by banking institutions (in the
name of preventing income management through the use of “cookie
jars”) may also have deepened the financial crisis.57
The recent global financial crisis is the worst crisis since the Great
Depression.58 It is far worse than the U.S. savings and loan crisis of
the late 1980s and early 1990s.59 But unemployment is not even
close to the figures experienced during the Great Depression (yet),
nor has sustained deflation or contraction in economic output
occurred.60 And the U.S. and world economies appear to be
stabilizing.61
But there are serious dangers ahead. If the United States or other
governments do not pull back the extraordinary assistance to the
markets soon enough, we could experience runaway inflation that
will be difficult to control. On the other hand, if the United States
and other governments pull back too quickly, we could see another
collapse in asset prices and a double-dip recession. Fed Chairman
Ben Bernanke recently stated that “the recession is very likely over at
this point, [but] it’s still going to feel like a very weak economy for
some time, as many people will still find that their job security . . . is
not what they wish it was.”62 Most economists seem to share
Chairman Bernanke’s cautious optimism.63 In contrast, Professor
Nouriel Roubini has stated that “Data from the US—rising

56. Gretchen Morgenson, House Panel Scrutinizes Rating Firms, N.Y. TIMES, October
22, 2008, at B1.
57. Ann Lee, Expect More Crisis, FORBES.COM, July 17, 2008, available at
http://www.forbes.com/2008/07/16/banks-crisis-illiquid-oped-cx_al_0716lee.html.
58. John Harwood, For Top Economic Aides, a Shaky Week in Office, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
24, 2010, at A11.
59. Michael Hudson and Jim Overton, The Second Savings and Loan Scandal, FORBES,
Jan. 21, 2009, available at http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/21/wamu-indymac-thriftsoped-cx_mh_jo_0121hudsonoverton.html.
60. Carolyn Lochhead, It’s Not the Depression, Top Obama Adviser Says, S.F. CHRON.,
Mar. 10, 2009, at A1.
61. Craig Torres, Bernanke Sees ‘Tentative Signs’ Economy Stabilizing,
BLOOMBERG.COM,
July
21,
2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601087&sid=aLZRcOJqCKME.
62. Sara Murray and Ann Zimmerman, Bernanke: Recession ‘Likely Over’, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 16, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125301730771311713.html.
63. Phil Izzo, Economists Call for Bernanke to Stay, Say Recession Is Over, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 11, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124993702311020493.html.

433

DO NOT DELETE

4/26/2010 8:05 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2010

unemployment, falling household consumption, still declining
industrial production and a weak housing market—suggests that the
U.S. recession is not over yet.”64 He later predicted that “the
economy is poised to slip back to anemic growth . . . in 2010, posing
the risk of a double-dip recession.”65
Particularly troubling signs in the United States include the
continued rise in unemployment, the percentages of mortgage loans
that are either delinquent or in foreclosure, and growing
delinquencies in the prime mortgage market. Most troubling of all,
the FDIC has already closed nearly 100 banks in 2009 and has more
than 400 additional banks (with $300 billion in assets) on its
“problem list” at a time when its deposit insurance fund is nearly
exhausted.66 While all 400 problem banks need not fail, a large
percentage of them are likely to fail in the near future.
II. PROGRAMS DESIGNED TO FIGHT THE CRISIS
I will give only a brief overview of the U.S. and international
government programs that were designed or implemented to arrest
the global financial crisis. Anyone who is interested in a more
complete analysis of the programs proposed or implemented in the
United States should consult The Davis Polk Financial Crisis
Manual, which contains a thorough analysis of the laws, regulations,
and contracts used in the United States to address the financial crisis.
Portions of the manual are excerpted below.
A. U.S. Programs
The U.S. programs designed to battle the financial crisis consist
primarily of the Treasury’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)
64. Nouriel Roubini, A Phantom Recovery? BUSINESS STANDARD, Aug. 19, 2009,
available
at
http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/nouriel-roubiniphantomrecovery/367421/.
65. Nouriel Roubini, Stop Asking When the Recession Will End, FORBES, Aug. 20, 2009,
available at http://www.forbes.com/2009/08/19/recession-job-losses-nber-gdp-growthopinions-columnists-nouriel-roubini.html.
66. In order to replenish the deposit insurance fund, the FDIC has proposed that
insured depository institutions prepay their quarterly risk-based assessments for the next three
years by the end of 2009. Currently, the FDIC projects that its liquidity needs would exceed
its liquid assets on hand beginning in the first quarter of 2010 (absent any action). The FDIC
estimates that total prepaid assessments would amount to $45 billion. See Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, 12 C.F.R. § 327 (2009), available at http://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/laws/federal/2009/09proposeAD49.pdf.
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implemented under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008 (EESA), as amended by the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA); the various programs
implemented by the Federal Reserve under its traditional discount
window authority for commercial banks and Section 13(3) of the
Federal Reserve Act; the FDIC’s use of its Deposit Insurance Fund
to provide critical assistance to the banking system, including
resolving failed banks and thrifts, temporarily increasing deposit
insurance coverage to $250,000 per person per institution, and its
Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP); and the
Treasury’s rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pursuant to the
authority granted by the Housing Economic Recovery Act of 2008
(HERA).
1. Federal Reserve programs
Despite the greater “press and political attention”67 paid to
TARP and the TLGP, the programs implemented by the Federal
Reserve under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act represent
the largest portion of U.S. government intervention.68 Section 13(3)
was used by the Federal Reserve to provide liquidity to Wall Street
and U.S. companies, rescue Bear Stearns and AIG, and conduct
monetary policy. Indeed, it was the government’s tool of choice
until the Bush Administration asked for new congressional
authority—first to inject capital directly into Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, and then to purchase troubled assets from and inject capital
directly into the U.S. financial system as a whole. As a result of such
programs, “the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet more than doubled
from August 2007 to December 2008, and [its] total assets at
December 31, 2008, at the height of the crisis, were more than $2
trillion, more than twice the highest year-end total in its history.”69
Section 13(3) permits the Federal Reserve to make “secured
extensions of credit to any ‘individual, partnership, or corporation.’
It is not limited to depository institutions. But it can be invoked only
under ‘unusual and exigent circumstances’ upon the affirmative vote
67. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 19.
68. Id.
69. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 26 (citing Niel Willardson, Actions to Restore Financial
Stability: A Summary of Recent Federal Initiatives, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS:
THE REGION (Dec. 2008), at 16, available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/
pubs/region/08-12/willardson.pdf.)
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of at least five members of the Federal Reserve.70 Until 2008, it had
not been used since the Great Depression.”71
a. Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF).
The Federal Reserve’s first use of its Section 13(3) authority
during the global financial crisis was to establish the TSLF on
March 11, 2008. . . In the weeks leading up to the program, the
credit markets had become frozen for certain highly leveraged
market participants.72 The TSLF was designed as a term lending
facility for primary dealers.”73 It was created to provide liquidity to
primary dealers, and specifically to add liquidity to the mortgagebacked securities [MBS] market.74 The Federal Reserve Bank of
New York was authorized to lend up to $200 billion of U.S.
Treasury securities to primary dealers secured for a term of 28 days
by pledge of eligible collateral. In effect, the program allowed
primary dealers to swap lower quality securities for higher quality

70. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 20 (citing the Federal Reserve Act by the Act of July 21,
1932, 47 Stat. 715).
71. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 20–21 (“Five days after its enactment, on July 26, 1932,
the Federal Reserve issued a circular permission to the Federal Reserve banks to make loans
under the new authority for a period of six months, beginning August 1, 1932, and renewed
such authorization from time to time until July 31, 1936. See Howard Hackley, LENDING
FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS: A HISTORY 129–30 (1973). Before March 11,
2008, all secured loans under Section 13(3) had been made during the 1932–36 period, with
most occurring in 1932 and 1933. Section 13(3) fell into disuse even during the Great
Depression principally because of: (i) the addition of Section 13(b) to the Federal Reserve Act
by the Industrial Advances Act of 1934, which authorized the Federal Reserve to make loans
to commercial and industrial companies without the emergency condition, and (ii) the ability
of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which was formed by the Hoover Administration
in 1932 pursuant to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 5, to make
loans to nonbanking companies on more attractive terms than those offered by the Federal
Reserve. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was liquidated in 1957 pursuant to the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation Liquidation Act of 1953 and Section 13(b) was repealed
by the Small Business Investment Act of 1958. See David Fettig, Lender of More than Last
Resort: Recalling Section 13(b) and the Years When the Federal Reserve Opened its Discount
Window to Businesses, THE REGION (Dec. 2002), at 18–19, 44–45, available at
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/region/02-12/lender.pdf; Walker Todd, History of
and Rationales for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, FED RES. BANK OF CLEVELAND
ECON REV., 1992 Q.4, at 24, available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/
review/1992/92-q4-todd.pdf; Howard Hackley, LENDING FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL
RESERVE BANKS: A HISTORY 127–136, 144–145 (1973)”). Id. at 21 n.17.
72. Id. at 22.
73. Id. (“Primary dealers are the 18 large financial institutions that are the
counterparties with which the Federal Reserve undertakes open market operations. Many of
the 18 were also Wall Street’s most prominent investment banks.”). Id at n.24.
74. Id. at 22.
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[U.S. Treasury] securities that could be used more easily to obtain
credit in the interbank or capital markets.75

b. Bear Stearns.
Despite the implementation of the TSLF, Bear Stearns suffered
a classic “run on the bank.” Its cash reserves fell from over $20
billion to $2 billion in approximately one week. By Friday, March
14, Bear Stearns was prepared to file for bankruptcy in the absence
of a significant capital infusion. Since no significant capital infusion
was forthcoming from the private sector, the Federal Reserve was
left as the only player that could quickly rescue Bear Stearns from
bankruptcy.76
On March 14, 2008, the Federal Reserve, by the unanimous
vote of all available members, authorized an extension of credit to
Bear Stearns through JPMorgan Chase Bank under Section
13(3).77 The Federal Reserve Bank of New York made an overnight
loan of $12.9 billion to JPMorgan Chase Bank through its normal
discount window facilities. The loan was nonrecourse and was fully
secured by $13.8 billion of Bear Stearns assets. The loan was a
simultaneous back-to-back transaction, whereby JPMorgan Chase
Bank provided secured financing to Bear Stearns and took as
collateral the same assets that JPMorgan Chase Bank used to secure
its loan from the Federal Reserve.78

75. Id. at 22–23 (“For ‘Schedule 1’ auctions, the eligible collateral included Treasury
securities, agency securities, and agency mortgage-backed securities issued or fully guaranteed
by the federal agencies. For ‘Schedule 2’ auctions, the eligible collateral includes Schedule 1
collateral plus highly rated private securities. Highly rated private securities refers to investment
grade corporate securities, investment grade municipal securities, investment grade mortgagebacked securities, and investment grade asset-backed securities. ‘Schedule 1’ auctions have
since been discontinued, while ‘Schedule 2’ auctions continue to take place. See FEDERAL
RESERVE, PERIODIC REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 129(B) OF THE EMERGENCY
ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: UPDATE ON OUTSTANDING LENDING FACILITIES
AUTHORIZED BY THE BOARD UNDER SECTION 13(3) OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT 2–4
(Aug. 25, 2009).”). Id. at 23 n.25.
76. Id. at 24 (citing David Wessel, IN FED WE TRUST 157–59 (2009)).
77. Id. (“Section 13(3) generally requires an affirmative vote of at least five members of
the Federal Reserve Board to approve an extension of credit under that provision. On March
14, 2008, one member of the Federal Reserve Board was unavailable at the time of the vote
because he was en route from Finland and two other board seats were vacant. See David
Wessel, IN FED WE TRUST 162 (2009). As permitted under Section 11(r)(2) of the Federal
Reserve Act, however, the Board’s action approving the extension of credit was adopted by
unanimous vote of all available members. See David Wessel, IN FED WE TRUST 162 (2009)”).
Id. at n.32.
78. Id. at 24–25.
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After the Federal Reserve’s emergency loan, the focus turned to
finding an acquirer for Bear Stearns—before the opening of
business in Asia on Monday morning, March 17, which was Sunday
evening, March 16 in the United States.79 JPMorgan initially
offered to acquire Bear Stearns for $2 per share, or approximately
$236 million in total, but later raised its price to $10 per share, or
approximately $1.1 billion in total, in order to obtain [approval for
the transaction from Bear Stearns shareholders].80 Since JPMorgan
did not want to acquire certain illiquid Bear Stearns assets, the
Federal Reserve was needed to absorb the risks associated with such
assets. The Federal Reserve only had the authority to lend and did
not have the authority to purchase assets, so any structure had to
be based on the Federal Reserve making a loan.81
The Federal Reserve authorized the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York to make a secured loan of up to $30 billion to a special
purpose vehicle, Maiden Lane, in order to purchase “less liquid” 82
assets of Bear Stearns and facilitate the acquisition of Bear Stearns
by JPMorgan. The loan was authorized pursuant to Section 13(3).
JPMorgan would be required to lend Maiden Lane $1 billion. The
Federal Reserve’s loan was secured by the assets held by Maiden
Lane.83

79. Id. at 25. (“During the worst weeks of the financial crisis in the fall of 2008,
weekend rescues generally operated under a Sunday evening deadline, reflecting the
importance of Asian markets. According to one commentator, Goldman Sachs’ economists
sent one of their weekly e-mails with the subject line “Sunday is the New Monday.” See David
Wessel, IN FED WE TRUST 1–2 (2009).”). Id. at 25, n.36.
80. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 25–26. (“Some commentators have noted that
JPMorgan’s bargaining position was weakened by the fact that it had agreed to guarantee all of
Bear Stearns’ obligations for one year from the signing of the acquisition agreement, and the
guarantee did not include a provision that would allow the guarantee to terminate if the Bear
Stearns shareholders failed to approve the transaction. See Steven M. Davidoff, Bear’s Big
Guarantee, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2008, available at http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/
2008/03/24/bears-big-guarantee/; Ashby Jones, Did Deal Overexpose JP Morgan?, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 25, 2008, at C2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1206409
36857461199.html?mod=hps_us_whats_news.”). Id. at 26 n.38.
81. Id. at 26.
82. Id. (citing Federal Reserve, Periodic Report Pursuant to Section 129(b) of the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008: Update on Outstanding Lending Facilities
Authorized by the Board under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act 9 (Aug. 25, 2009)).
83. Id. (citing Federal Reserve, Periodic Report Pursuant to Section 129(b) of the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008: Update on Outstanding Lending Facilities
Authorized by the Board under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act 9–10 (Aug. 25,
2009)).
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c. Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF).
Although Bear Stearns had been rescued, there was a fear that
other investment banks with similar funding models could also face
liquidity squeezes and ultimately the risk of failure. In order to
provide these institutions with more liquidity and prevent this
outcome, the Federal Reserve announced the creation of the PDCF
on March 16, 2008, under Section 13(3).84 The PDCF is a
temporary overnight liquidity facility that provides secured loans to
primary dealers. The PDCF allows primary dealers to borrow funds
from the Federal Reserve secured by a broader range of collateral
than is permissible to secure borrowings under the discount
window. Since the primary dealers included the largest investment
banks in the United States, the PDCF provided the largest U.S.
broker-dealers with temporary access to a Federal Reserve facility
that is very similar to the Federal Reserve discount window.85

d. AIG. “In the third quarter of 2008, AIG started to experience
an increasingly serious liquidity crunch,”86 largely because of its
securities lending business and the credit default swap portfolio of its
affiliate, AIG Financial Products (AIGFP). “Under AIG’s securities
lending program, AIG lent securities on behalf of its insurance
company subsidiaries against cash collateral that was received from
borrowers and invested in securities,”87 including residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). AIG was responsible for any
deficit in the cash collateral pool caused by any losses sustained in
investing it or if AIG’s credit rating were downgraded. Under
AIGFP’s credit default swap contracts, AIGFP was required to post
collateral if the collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) protected by
its credit default swaps fell in value or AIG’s credit rating were
downgraded.
Because of drops in the value of RMBS and CDOs in August,
AIG was required to post $3.3 billion of additional collateral into its
securities lending program88 and AIGFP was required to post $5.9
billion of additional collateral to secure its credit default swap

84. See Press Release, Federal Reserve (Mar. 16, 2008), available
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080316a.htm.
85. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 26.
86. Id. at 28.
87. Id.
88. Am. Int’l Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Mar. 2, 2009).

at
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obligations.89 After downgrades in AIG’s credit ratings in early
September, AIGFP estimated that it would need an additional
amount in excess of $20 billion in order to fund additional collateral
requirements under its credit default swap obligations.90 Inability to
refinance its commercial paper commitments, sharp declines in AIG’s
common stock, and regulatory constraints on AIG’s ability to
borrow from its insurance company subsidiaries left AIG in severe
difficulty during the weekend of September 13–14. AIG explored
the possibility of a secured lending facility from the private sector,
but was unable to obtain the necessary liquidity or capital from that
avenue.91
“On September 16, 2008, pursuant to Section 13(3), the
Federal Reserve authorized the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to
lend AIG up to $85 billion under a secured revolving credit
facility.”92 “As a condition to the loan . . . AIG also agreed to issue
to a trust established for the benefit of the U.S. Treasury, a series of
senior preferred stock”93 and warrants equal to approximately 80% of
the economics and voting power of the company.94
The loan was restructured in November to include loans to two
new special-purpose vehicles.95 The Federal Reserve lent
approximately $19.5 billion to Maiden Lane II so that the SPV
could purchase MBS from AIG.96 It lent approximately $19.6 billion
to Maiden Lane III so that the SPV could purchase from AIGFP’s

89. Id.
90. Id. at 4.
91. Id. at 3–5.
92. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 30 (citing Federal Reserve, Periodic Report Pursuant to
Section 129(b) of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008: Update on
Outstanding Lending Facilities Authorized by the Board Under Section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act 12 (Aug. 25, 2009).
93. Id. at 31.
94. Id. (“Because of the degree to which the deemed conversion of the AIG Series C
Preferred Stock is dilutive to AIG’s common stockholders, the shares underlying Treasury’s
warrants, which are not adjusted for the conversion, represent only a tiny fraction of the total
voting power of AIG’s equity. As a result, the AIG Series C Preferred Stock currently
represents approximately 79.8% of the total voting power.”) Id. at 3 n.60.
95. “In addition to the Federal Reserve’s actions, Treasury also later acquired $40
billion in senior preferred stock of AIG.” Id. at 31 n.61; see also Am. Int’l Group, Inc.,
Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 3–5 (Aug. 7, 2009).
96. Am. Int’l Group, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 12, 2008).
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counterparties $62 billion of CDOs that were “protected by
AIGFP’s credit default swaps.”97
e. Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund
Liquidity Facility (AMLF) and Commercial Paper Funding Facility
(CPFF).
By the fall of 2008, . . . money market mutual funds [were]
facing severe liquidity pressure. After the failure of a large money
market mutual fund, Reserve Primary Fund, investors began a run
on money market mutual funds that lasted for weeks. Redemptions
totaled over $100 billion. In the face of redemptions, money
market mutual funds had to start selling assets, including . . .
commercial paper . . . .98

Because of these fire sales, commercial paper issuers started to
face liquidity pressures of their own, forcing many of them to draw
on back-up lines of credit from banks. This put further pressure on
the banking system because most banks had not anticipated that so
many of these back-up facilities would be drawn at once. “In order
to address the fire sales of commercial paper as a result of
redemption pressures and the lack of liquidity in the commercial
paper market, the Federal Reserve created the AMLF and the
CPFF.”99
“The AMLF was authorized by the Federal Reserve on
September 19, 2008 to provide funding to U.S. depository
institutions and bank holding companies and their U.S. brokerdealer subsidiaries to finance purchases of high-quality asset-backed
commercial paper from money market mutual funds.”100 The CPFF
was authorized on October 14, 2008, to establish a special-purpose
vehicle to purchase three-month unsecured and asset-backed
commercial paper directly from eligible issuers, including any U.S.
commercial paper issuer including those with foreign parents.101
97. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 32; Am. Int’l Group, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K)
(Nov. 25, 2008).
98. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 32.
99. Id. (citing Brian F. Madigan, Dir., Div. of Monetary Affairs, Fed. Reserve, Bagehot’s
Dictum in Practice: Formulating and Implementing Policies to Combat the Financial Crisis,
Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Annual Economic Symposium (Aug. 21,
2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/madigan20090821
a.htm).
100. Id. at 33.
101. Id.
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f. Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF).
The financial crisis has deeply affected the securitization market.
In a period of months, the pendulum swung from a condition in
which the financial markets assigned too low a value to the risk of
certain securitization asset classes—such as subprime mortgages—
to one in which seemingly the only securities that were readily
marketable were those with an explicit or implicit government
backing. Issuance of securities backed by credit card receivables and
auto loans slowed to a trickle, and the sale of new commercial
[MBS] (CMBS) ceased altogether. The absence of a functioning
securitization market in turn severely constrained the practical
ability of banks and other financial institutions to extend new loans
to consumers and businesses.102
In an effort to revive the [asset-backed securities] (ABS) markets
and provide “a critical channel for supply of new credit to
households,”103 the Federal Reserve created TALF, which began
operations in March 2009 under the administration of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York.104 Recently, Secretary Geithner
characterized TALF as “[o]ne of the most important” Federal
Reserve programs.105 Through TALF, the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York provides non-recourse loans to borrowers, secured by
qualifying non-mortgage-backed ABS and, more recently, CMBS.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York is expected to lend up to
$200 billion, but TALF may be expanded to allow the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York to lend as much as $1 trillion. TALF is
scheduled to stop making new loans on March 31, 2010 for nonmortgage-backed ABS and legacy CMBS and on June 30, 2010 for
newly issued CMBS.106
Initially greeted with tepid interest, the program has since
gained momentum. Through September 2009, investors have

102. Id. at 144.
103. Id. (quoting U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, THE NEXT PHASE OF GOVERNMENT
FINANCIAL STABILIZATION AND REHABILITATION POLICIES 3 (Sept. 14, 2009), available at
http://treas.gov/press/releases/docs/Next%20Phase%20of%20Financial%20Policy,%20Final,
%202009-09-14.pdf.).
104. Id.
105. Id. (quoting Written Testimony of Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner: Hearing
Before the Cong. Oversight Panel, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Timothy Geithner,
Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/
testimony-091009-geithner.pdf.).
106. Id. at 144–45.

442

DO NOT DELETE

421

4/26/2010 8:05 PM

The Global Financial Crisis

requested $46.5 billion worth of TALF loans to purchase eligible
ABS.107

2. Treasury programs
The original vision of the TARP was that Treasury would
purchase up to $700 billion of “troubled assets” from “financial
institutions.”108
The TARP facility was expected to be used to purchase mortgages
and other real-estate related assets in order to stabilize, enhance or
at least establish reliable market values for illiquid assets.
That original vision, however, was never implemented. Instead,
Treasury and the Federal Reserve quickly abandoned that plan and
used TARP funds to make direct investments in the US financial
system through [the Capital Purchase Program].109

a. Capital Purchase Program (CPP). The CPP earmarked $250
billion for direct investments in U.S. financial institutions.
When the CPP was officially announced, regulators had already
summoned the CEOs of the nation’s nine largest financial
institutions to a meeting in Washington to inform them that their
institutions had been designated as systemically important, and that
therefore they would, whether they or their boards felt their
institutions needed it or not, sign the term sheets put in front of
them and accept the government investment.110 The CEOs of these
institutions all signed the one-page term sheets that day, which
formed the basis of securities purchase agreements for the purchase

107. Id. at 145 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, THE NEXT PHASE OF GOVERNMENT
FINANCIAL STABILIZATION AND REHABILITATION POLICIES 38 (Sept. 14, 2009), available at
http://treas.gov/press/releases/docs/Next%20Phase%20of%20Financial%20Policy,%20Final,
%202009-09-14.pdf).
108. Id. at 41.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 69 (citing Joe Weisenthal, Documents Reveal How Paulson Forced Banks to
Take TARP Cash, BUS. INSIDER, May 13, 2009, available at http://www.
businessinsider.com/uncovered-tarp-docs-reveal-howpaulson-forced-banks-to-take-the-cash2009-5; Joanna Ossinger, Report: Paulson Told Banks They Must Take TARP Money, FOX BUS.,
May 13, 2009, available at http://www.foxbusiness.com/story/report-paulson-told-bankstarp-money/; David Wessel, IN FED WE TRUST 236–241 (2009)).
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of preferred stock and warrants that were later signed by the
financial institutions.111

Unlike the preferred stock the government purchased from
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG, this preferred stock was not
senior to outstanding preferred stock. Instead, it was pari passu. In
addition, the warrants were for a relatively small amount of common
stock rather than 80% of the company. These terms reflected a
fundamental shift in policy from a focus on preventing moral hazard
to a focus on restoring public confidence in the U.S. financial
system.
After Treasury set aside $125 billion for the nine largest
financial institutions . . . it offered the remaining $125 billion to
other U.S. banking institutions, including regional and community
banks, but only the banking institutions [other than the top nine]
that were determined to be “healthy.”112 Indeed, after the initial
announcement, many regional financial institutions requested CPP
investments to avoid being tainted as “unhealthy.” There was
widespread fear that banks that did not request CPP investments
would suffer deposit runs and possibly failure because their
customers would conclude that they were unhealthy.113

111. Id. (“For one version of the events leading up to the meeting where the regulators
announced to the nine largest bank holding companies that they had no choice but to accept
such capital, see David Wessel, IN FED WE TRUST 236–41 (2009).”). Id. at 69 n.5.
112. Id. at 70. Recently, the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (“SIGTARP”), issued a report describing the CPP as a program for
“healthy banks,” and questioning whether all of the nine largest financial institutions were in
fact considered by the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve to be “healthy” at the time. See
Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, Emergency
Capital Injections Provided to Support the Viability of Bank of America, Other Major Banks, and
the U.S. Financial System (Oct. 5, 2009), available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/
audit/2009/Emergency_Capital_Injections_Provided_to_Support_the_Viability_of_Bank_of_
America.._100509.pdf. This criticism fundamentally mischaracterizes what the U.S. Treasury
and the Federal Reserve said and did at the time. Indeed, the reason all nine were required to
receive TARP money, rather than making it a fully voluntary choice, is that the U.S. Treasury
and the Federal Reserve wanted to avoid characterizations of which ones of these large nine
institutions were healthy or not at the time because they believed that sort of characterization
would deepen the panic already underway. Instead, healthiness determinations were reserved
to banks and bank holding companies that applied for some of the second $125 billion of CPP
money.
113. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 70.
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b. Systemically Significant Failing Institutions Program.
On November 10, 2008, Treasury announced a restructuring of
the government’s financial support to AIG. As part of that
overhaul, Treasury indicated that it would purchase $40 billion of
newly issued preferred stock, under the Systemically Significant
Failing Institutions Program, with the proceeds used in part to
reduce the total amount available under AIG’s September 22, 2008
secured revolving credit agreement with the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York.114

c. Targeted Investment Program.
Treasury first issued guidelines for the Targeted Investment
Program on January 2, 2009, after previously announcing its
investment in Citigroup on November 22, 2008, and beginning
discussions with Bank of America about additional TARP
investments in December 2008 in anticipation of the closing of its
purchase of Merrill Lynch on January 1, 2009.115
Treasury has invested $20 billion each via the Targeted
Investment Program in both Citigroup and Bank of America by
purchasing perpetual preferred securities. Treasury’s investment
supplements the initial TARP investments made under the CPP in
these financial institutions.116

d. Asset Guarantee Program.
The Asset Guarantee Program was announced as a package with
the Targeted Investment Program. Under the Asset Guarantee
Program, the U.S. government entered into a definitive agreement
with Citigroup to share losses with respect to a pool of $301 billion
in assets of Citigroup. Although the government agreed to the
terms of a similar program with Bank of America with respect to a
pool of $118 billion of assets, the majority of which were assumed
as a result of the Merrill Lynch acquisition, the parties never
executed definitive documents for that program. On September 21,
2009, Bank of America announced that it had reached an

114. Id. at 76.
115. Id. at 77.
116. Id.
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agreement with regulators to pay a $425 million fee to terminate
the term sheet.117
Citigroup agreed to absorb the first losses in its covered assets
portfolio up to $39.5 billion. The Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, Treasury and the FDIC share any additional losses with
Citigroup, with the government absorbing 90% of that loss and
Citigroup 10%.118 Citigroup must manage the assets in the pool
in accordance with guidance from a template issued by the
government, including mortgage modification procedures adopted
by the FDIC.119

e. Capital Assistance Program (CAP) and stress tests.
CAP was announced by Secretary Geithner on February 10,
2009. There are two main components of CAP:
stress tests to determine whether certain institutions need
additional capital buffers; and
a capital assistance program through which eligible public
institutions may apply for capital infusions from Treasury.
The program’s emphasis on capital composition in the stress
tests and preferred stock terms that add the ability to convert to
common stock demonstrate Treasury’s continued concern with
increasing tangible common equity in recipient financial
institutions.120
CAP enables qualifying financial institutions (QFIs) to issue
mandatory convertible preferred stock to Treasury in order to
provide such institutions with contingent common equity “as a
bridge to private capital in the future,” as is necessary to “retain the
confidence of investors or to meet supervisory expectations
regarding the amount and composition of capital.”121 The capital

117. Id. at 78 (citing Press Release, Bank of America, Bank of America Terminates Asset
Guarantee Term Sheet (Sept. 21, 2009), available at http://newsroom.bankofamerica.
com/index.php?s=43&item=8536); see also Margaret Popper and David Mildenberg, Bank of
America to Pay $425 Million for Merrill Aid (Update 1), BLOOMBERG, Sept. 22, 2009,
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a2c5hY E7Uv.Y.
118. Id. at 78–79.
119. Id. at 79.
120. Id. at 82.
121. Id. at 85 (quoting Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Joint
Statement by Secretary of the Treasury Timothy F. Geithner, Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Sheila Bair, and Comptroller of the Currency John C. Dugan (May 6,

446

DO NOT DELETE

421

4/26/2010 8:05 PM

The Global Financial Crisis

infusions are meant to increase capital buffers at QFIs to guard
against economic conditions that are worse than expected. QFIs
that issue mandatory convertible preferred stock under CAP are
also required to issue to Treasury warrants to purchase shares of the
institution’s common stock. No QFI has asked for funds under
CAP.122 Absent unusual circumstances or an extreme change in
economic circumstances, it is unlikely that any CAP preferred will
be issued.123

f. Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP).
PPIP is the latest U.S. government initiative to address the
enduring problem of illiquid and troubled assets on financial
institutions’ balance sheets. The program, announced by Secretary
Geithner on March 23, 2009, was originally hailed as a vital
component of the government’s plan to heal the financial sector. It
received a warm welcome from Wall Street, with the Dow Jones
Industrial Average rising 7% on the day of its announcement.
Enthusiasm for PPIP waned over the following months, however,
falling off particularly sharply after the results of the stress tests
were announced on May 7, 2009, during which time it became
clear that large financial institutions, at least, were once again able
to tap the capital markets and would, therefore, be less likely to use
PPIP to sell troubled assets, and as concerns were raised about the
intersection of sales and mark-to-market accounting.124
As originally contemplated, PPIP had two halves: the Legacy
Securities Program run by Treasury and the Legacy Loans Program
run by the FDIC. Both programs contemplated the formation of
investment funds capitalized with equity from Treasury and private
investors to be leveraged with potentially attractive government
financing in the form of either direct loans or debt guarantees, each
fund a public-private investment fund or PPIF.125
A key principle underlying PPIP was a belief that, with the
assistance of government capital and leverage, the private sector
could be induced to purchase these troubled and illiquid assets at
2009),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/
20090506a.htm).
122. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JULY OVERSIGHT REPORT: TARP REPAYMENTS,
INCLUDING THE REPURCHASE OF STOCK WARRANTS (July 1, 2009), available at
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-071009-report.pdf.
123. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 85.
124. Id. at 181.
125. Id.

447

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

4/26/2010 8:05 PM

2010

prices substantially in excess of the then-current market price. Both
the government and the banks believed that such market prices
simply reflected speculative “vulture” funds taking advantage of the
distress of the banks and the dysfunctional credit markets to
purchase assets at fractions of their underlying economic value.126
In June 2009, the FDIC indefinitely postponed the Legacy
Loans Program, although in late summer of 2009 it held a pilot
sale of receivership assets in a transaction that it hopes will serve as
a template for transactions involving banks that have not been
closed if and when the program is expanded to them. While
Treasury has moved forward with the Legacy Securities Program, it
faces numerous uncertainties. PPIP is now considerably smaller
than originally anticipated, involving Treasury commitments of $30
billion, down from the initial announcement of $75-$100 billion,
and it is unclear whether the program has the scale to address the
underlying problem.127
Valuation and accounting issues are central to understanding
both the need for PPIP and the challenges affecting its success.
Accounting rules do not require certain whole loans to be markedto-market, and many financial institutions understandably have not
done so. Should financial institutions sell these assets at a material
discount to par, potentially substantial losses would translate into
significant depletion of capital. By contrast, accounting rules
require MBS and CDOs to be marked-to-market if they are
classified as either “trading securities” or “available-for-sale
securities.” Because fair value accounting applies to MBS and
CDOs, many such assets have already been marked down to market
or near-market levels, potentially making these assets better
candidates for sale through PPIP.128

126. Id.
127. Id. at 182. Recently, the U.S. Treasury announced the initial closings of two funds
established under the Legacy Securities Program, each with committed equity capital of $500
million from private investors. Collectively, the public-private investment funds have closed on
approximately $1.13 billion of private sector capital commitments, which have been matched
100% by the U.S. Treasury, representing total equity capital commitments of $2.26 billion.
The U.S. Treasury will also provide debt financing up to 100% of the total capital
commitments of each fund. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Department
Announces Initial Closings of Legacy securities Public-Private Investment Funds, Press Room
(Sept. 30, 2009), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/ releases/tg304.htm.
128. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 182–83 (“In addition, the FDIC earlier this year
reaffirmed a capital rule that requires banks to hold additional capital against subordinated
tranches of certain ABS if the senior tranches of such securities have been downgraded. This
increased capital obligation could potentially require ‘dollar for dollar’ capital against the asset,
which would potentially make these assets candidates for sale through PPIP.”). Id. at 183 n.2.
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g. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. On September 6, 2008, the
U.S. government took control of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae as
conservator, pursuant to the authority granted by HERA that
Congress passed only several weeks prior.129 In connection with the
conservatorship, the U.S. government provided each of the GSEs
with up to $100 billion of direct financial assistance in the form of
senior preferred stock and temporary access to the Federal Reserve’s
discount window. The U.S. Treasury also agreed to purchase an
unspecified amount of MBS backed by the GSEs in the open market.
As part of its fee for providing the financial support, the U.S.
Treasury took a 79.9% interest in the common stock of each
institution. The rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is the largest
government-assisted transaction in the U.S. history, as these two
institutions hold or guarantee a combined $5.5 trillion of mortgagebacked securities.
To further boost market confidence in the two GSEs, on
February 18, 2009, the U.S. Treasury announced that the funding
commitments would be increased to $200 billion for each
institution.130 As of October 1, 2009, Fannie Mae has received $44.9
billion of direct financial assistance from the U.S. Treasury, and
Freddie Mac has received $50.7 billion.131 The U.S. Treasury has
also purchased a total of $181.5 billion of GSE MBS, as of October
1, 2009.132 On top of the U.S. Treasury’s financial assistance, the
Federal Reserve established programs to purchase up to a total of
$200 billion direct obligations of the GSEs and to purchase up to a
total of $1.25 trillion of MBS that are guaranteed by the GSEs.133

129. For more information, see Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr., on Treasury
and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets and Taxpayers (Sept.
7, 2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1129.htm.
130. See WHITE HOUSE BUDGET, GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES, FISCAL
YEAR 2010, available at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2010/assets/gov.pdf (last
visited Jan. 16, 2010).
131. See Data as of October 1, 2009 on Treasury and Federal Reserve Purchase Programs
for GSE and Mortgage-Related Securities, available at http://www.fhfa.gov/
webfiles/14896/TreasFed9242009.pdf.
132. Id. at 116–17.
133. See Fed. Reserve Press Release (Mar. 18, 2009), available at www.
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20090318a.htm. As of October 1, 2009, the
Federal Reserve has purchased a total of $133.8 billion of direct obligations of the GSEs and a
total of $904.9 billion of GSE MBS. See Data as of October 1, 2009 on Treasury and Federal
Reserve Purchase Programs for GSE and Mortgage-Related Securities, available at http://
www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/14896/TreasFed9242009.pdf.
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The future of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae is uncertain. The
U.S. Treasury’s White Paper on Financial Regulatory Reform,
released in June 2009, stated that the U.S. Treasury will report to
Congress its recommendations on the future of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac at the time of the 2011 budget release.134
3. FDIC’s Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP)
“The FDIC Board approved the TLGP in October 2008 as part
of an effort by the FDIC, the Treasury, and the Federal Reserve to
stabilize the nation’s financial system.”135 There are two parts to the
TLGP: the Debt Guarantee Program and the Transaction Account
Guarantee Program. Through the Debt Guarantee Program, the
FDIC guarantees certain senior unsecured debt issued by
participating insured depository institutions, their holding
companies, or their affiliates.136 Through the Transaction Account
Guarantee Program, the FDIC provides unlimited deposit insurance
for certain transaction accounts at participating insured depository
institutions.
The Debt Guarantee Program has been highly attractive to
participating entities, particularly the larger bank holding
companies, because it provides access to funding at relatively low
cost. Regardless of the participating entity’s credit rating, the three
major credit rating agencies rate debt issued under the TLGP with
their highest ratings based on the FDIC guarantee. Most fixed-rate
debt issued under the Debt Guarantee Program bears an annual
interest rate between 1.5% and 3%.137

134. Department of the Treasury, Financial Regulatory Reform, A NEW FOUNDATION:
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (June 17, 2009), available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf. In the White Paper, the
U.S. Treasury listed a number of options for the reform of the GSEs, including: (i) returning
them to their previous status as GSEs with the paired interests of maximizing returns for
private shareholders and pursuing public policy home ownership goals; (ii) the gradual winddown of their operations and liquidation of their assets; (iii) incorporating the GSEs’ functions
into a federal agency; (iv) a public utility model where the government regulates the GSEs’
profit margin, sets guarantee fees, and provides explicit backing for GSE commitments; (v)
conversion to providing insurance for covered bonds; and (vi) the dissolution of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac into many smaller companies. See id. at 41–42, available at http://www.
financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf.
135. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 116.
136. Id. at 117.
137. Id. (citing Marshall Eckblad, Banks Repaying TARP Still Enjoy Vast Government
Debt Aid, NASDAQ, June 12, 2009, available at http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/stock-market-
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The FDIC is now winding down the Debt Guarantee Program, with
October 31, 2009, as the last day for a participating entity to issue
guaranteed debt. The FDIC is considering the establishment of a
limited, six-month emergency guarantee facility following the
expiration of the Debt Guarantee Program on October 31, 2009.
“Entities that issue debt under the emergency guarantee facility
would be permitted to issue FDIC-guaranteed debt through April
30, 2010.”138
Under the FDIC’s general deposit insurance program, deposits
that are not subject to the transaction account guarantee are insured
up to $250,000 per person per institution, through December 31,
2013.139 The Transaction Account Guarantee Program provides
unlimited insurance coverage for any balances in a non-interest
bearing transaction account through June 30, 2010.140
B. U.K. Programs
The U.K. programs designed to battle the financial crisis consist
primarily of:141 HM Treasury’s Bank Recapitalisation Fund to make
capital available to eligible banks and building societies, its Credit
Guarantee Scheme to guarantee certain senior unsecured debt and
other liabilities of eligible institutions, its Asset Protection Scheme to
insure against losses for certain asset pools of certain targeted banks,
and a permanent increase in the deposit compensation limit from
£35,000 to £50,000; programs implemented by the Bank of England
news-story.aspx?storyid=200906121341dowjonesdjonline000736&title=banks-repaying-tarpstill-enjoy-vast-government-debt-aid.).
138. Id. at 126. See FDIC, NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING (Sept. 9, 2009),
http://www.fdic.gov/news/board/NoticeSept9no6.pdf
(proposing
alternatives
for
concluding the debt guarantee program of the TLGP).
139. See Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111–22, 123 Stat.
1632 (2009) (amending § 13(c)(4)(G)(ii) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C.
1823(c)(4)).
140. Despite outcries from some critics in the United States that the extraordinary
measures taken by the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC in response to the recent
global financial crisis threaten to transform the United States economy from a capitalistic
system to a socialistic one, the measures that have been taken have stopped well short of the
sort of nationalization that has resulted from government interventions in the past, including
in ancient times. See, e.g., Genesis 47:13–26, which describes how the seven years of famine
ended with Pharaoh having acquired all the money, cattle, and land of Egypt, and reduced the
population to a sort of voluntary servitude.
141. For more information, see Davis Polk & Wardell, UK and US Financial Rescue
Packages (Jan. 28, 2009), available at http://www.davispolk.com/1485409/clientmemos/
2009/01.28.09.UK.US.FRP.survey.pdf.
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to increase liquidity to financial systems through the Asset Purchase
Facility and other liquidity facilities; and the institution of a special
resolution regime for banks and building societies.
1. HM Treasury programs
On October 8, 2008, HM Treasury announced a package of
rescue measures, including the establishment of a £50 billion Bank
Recapitalization Fund and a Credit Guarantee Scheme of up to £250
billion.142 On January 19, 2009, HM Treasury announced an Asset
Protection Scheme when the initial phase of rescue measures proved
insufficient to stabilize the financial system.143
a. Bank Recapitalisation Fund. The eligible institutions for HM
Treasury’s Bank Recapitalisation Fund are U.K. incorporated banks
(including U.K. subsidiaries of foreign institutions) that have a
“substantial business” in the United Kingdom and building societies.
When the Bank Recapitalisation Fund capital injection program was
announced on October 8, 2008, seven major U.K. banks and the
largest building society were expected to participate in the
program.144 The £50 billion was ultimately taken by only two major
banks, the Royal Bank of Scotland Group (RBSG), and the merged
Lloyds TSB/HBOS.145 The initial round of capital injections took
the form of preferred shares. HM Treasury later bought ordinary
shares in these two banks (in part by conversion of the preferred

142. See HM TREASURY, REFORMING FINANCIAL MARKETS 9 (July 8, 2009)
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/reforming_financial_markets080709.pdf; HM Treasury,
Financial Support to the Banking Industry (Oct. 8, 2008), available at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/press_100_08.htm.
143. See HM Treasury, Statement on the Government’s Asset Protection Scheme (Jan. 19,
2009), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_07_09.htm.
144. See HM Treasury, Financial Support to the Banking Industry (Oct. 8, 2008),
available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_100_08.htm. The institutions expected to
participate were Abbey National, Barclays, HBOS, HSBC Bank plc, Lloyds TSB, Nationwide
Building Society, the Royal Bank of Scotland Group, and Standard Chartered.
145. See HM Treasury, Treasury Statement on Financial Support to the Banking Industry
(Oct. 13, 2008), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_105_08.htm; HM
Treasury, Treasury Statement on Restructuring its Investment in RBS to Deliver Further Bank
Lending to Industry and Homeowners (Oct. 13, 2008), available at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/press_06_09.htm; HM Treasury, Asset Protection Scheme (Feb. 26, 2009),
available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/statement_chx_260209.htm [hereinafter Asset
Protection Scheme]; HM Treasury, Asset Protection Scheme—Agreement with Lloyds (Mar. 7,
2009), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_23_09.htm.
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shares invested earlier), resulting in the government owning 84% of
RBSG and 43.5% of Lloyds TSB/HBOS.146
b. Credit Guarantee Scheme.147 The Credit Guarantee Scheme
provides guarantees of new short- and medium-term senior
unsecured debt issued by U.K.-incorporated banks, including certain
U.K. subsidiaries of foreign institutions. Unlike the United States’
TLGP, which charged a flat fee varying with maturity, the cost of the
Credit Guarantee Scheme is linked to the participating institution’s
median five-year credit default swap spreads from July 2, 2007 to
July 1, 2008, applied retrospectively. In comparison to the United
States’ TLGP, where the Federal Reserve determined the risk
weighting of FDIC-guaranteed obligations would be 20% for riskbased capital purposes, the FSA determined the risk weighting for
HM Treasury-guaranteed obligations to be zero. Apart from senior
unsecured debt, the Credit Guarantee Scheme was later extended to
provide credit enhancement on other types of bank liabilities, such as
certain eligible triple-A rated asset-backed securities, including those
backed by mortgages and corporate and consumer debt.148
c. Asset Protection Scheme. Similar to the structure in the U.S.
Asset Guarantee Program, the U.K. Asset Protection Scheme
provides protection against losses on a defined asset pool above a
certain threshold. The U.K. Asset Protection Scheme was used by
HM Treasury to intervene in two major banks, RBS and Lloyds
TSB/HBOS.149 The U.K. government agreed to share losses with
RBS with respect to an asset pool of £325 billion. RBS would bear
the first portion of any losses, up to a total first loss of 6% or some
£20 billion. After that, the U.K. government would bear the risk on
up to 90% of any additional losses. RBS would pay a fee of 2% of the
value of the assets insured, or approximately £6.5 billion. In the case
of Lloyds TSB/HBOS, the asset pool is £260 billion. Lloyds

146. See Asset Protection Scheme, supra note 145; HM Treasury, Asset Protection Scheme Agreement with Lloyds (Mar. 7, 2009), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.
uk/press_23_09.htm [hereinafter Lloyds].
147. See generally United Kingdom Debt Management Office, 2008 Credit Guarantee
Scheme, available at http://www.dmo.gov.uk/index.aspx?page=CGS/CGS_about (last visited
Jan. 15 2010).
148. See generally United Kingdom Debt Management Office, 2009 Asset-Backed
Securities Guarantee Scheme, available at http://www.dmo.gov.uk/index.aspx?page=
CGS/ABS_about (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
149. See HM Treasury, Asset Protection Scheme (Feb. 26, 2009), available at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/statement_chx_260209.htm; Lloyds, supra note 146.
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TSB/HBOS agreed to bear the first losses on up to 9.6% of the asset
pool, or some £25 billion, and to pay a guarantee fee of 6% of the
assets insured, or £15.6 billion. As with the RBS program, the U.K.
government would bear the losses on up to 90% of any additional
losses in the pool.
In connection to entering the Asset Protection Program with
HM Treasury, the banks agreed to quantified lending commitments.
For instance, RBS agreed to lend an additional £25 billion on
commercial terms for mortgages and businesses on top of its current
scale of lending both in 2009 and 2010. Lloyds TSB/HBOS agreed
to lend an additional £14 billion on similar terms.
2. Bank of England programs
In response to the financial crisis, the Bank of England lowered
its official Bank Rate to 1.5%, the lowest rate since the creation of
the central bank in 1694. To provide more liquidity to the financial
system, the Bank of England established the Asset Purchase Facility
to purchase certain high quality private sector assets, and other
liquidity facilities, such as the Special Liquidity Scheme.
a. Asset Purchase Facility. On January 19, 2009, the Bank of
England announced the Asset Purchase Facility with an initial
commitment of up to £50 billion, which was expanded later up to
£125 billion.150 In comparison to the Federal Reserve programs, the
Bank of England’s Asset Purchase Facility is much smaller in scale.
Also, unlike the Federal Reserve’s program, the Asset Purchase
Facility had to be authorized and guaranteed by HM Treasury, with
the main parameters of the programs being set by the Treasury.151
150. See Press Release, HM Treasury, Statement on Financial Intervention to Support
Lending in the Economy (Jan. 19, 2009), available at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/press_05_09.htm; Press Release, Bank of Eng., Bank of England Reduces
Bank Rate by 0.5 Percentage Points to 0.5% and Announces £75 Billion Asset Purchase
Programme
(Mar.
5,
2009),
available
at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
publications/news/2009/019.htm; Press Release, Bank of Eng., Bank of England Maintains
Bank Rate at 0.5% and Increases Size of Asset Purchase Programme by £50 Billion to £125
Billion (May 7, 2009), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ publications/news/
2009/037.htm; Press Release, Bank of Eng., Bank of England Maintains Bank Rate at 0.5%
and Increases Size of Asset Purchase Programme by £50 Billion to £175 Billion (Aug. 6,
2009), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/ news/2009/063.htm.
151. See Letter from HM Treasury to Bank of Eng. (Jan. 29, 2009), available at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/ck_letter_Bank of England290109.pdf; Letter from Bank
of Eng. to HM Treasury (Jan. 29, 2009), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
markets/apfgovletter090129.pdf.
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Many types of high quality private sector assets are covered by
the Asset Purchase Facility, including debt issued under the Credit
Guarantee Scheme, corporate bonds, commercial paper, syndicated
loans, certain asset-backed securities, and gilts.
b. Other liquidity facilities. Other Bank of England liquidity
facilities consist primarily of the Special Liquidity Scheme, the
Discount Window Facility and the expansion of its long-term repo
operations. The Special Liquidity Scheme allows authorized
institutions to swap illiquid assets of sufficiently high quality for U.K.
Treasury Bills for up to three years.152 The Scheme was designed to
finance certain illiquid assets on banks’ balance sheets by exchanging
them temporarily for more easily tradable assets. Under the Discount
Window Facility, effective February 2, 2009, the Bank of England
permits eligible banks and building societies to borrow gilts, for 30
or 364 days, against a wide range of collateral in return for a fee.153
With respect to its long-term repo operations, the Bank of England
increased the amount and frequency of its three-month lending and
expanded the range of collateral eligible in those operations to
include asset-backed securities, among other things.
3. Special resolution regimes for banks and building societies
Until early this year, the U.K. insolvency laws did not distinguish
banks from other commercial companies. The Banking Act 2009
(Banking Act) instituted a special resolution regime (SRR) for U.K.incorporated banks and building societies, effectively replacing the
Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008, an emergency piece of
legislation to deal with the Northern Rock crisis.154 The Banking Act
152. For more information, see Bank of England, Special Liquidity Scheme,
http://www. bankofengland.co.uk/markets/sls/index.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
153. See Bank of England, Sterling Money Market Operations Discount Window Facility,
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/money/discount/index.htm (last visited Jan. 15,
2010).
154. See The Banking Act, 2009 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/
acts2009/pdf/ukpga_20090001_en.pdf. For more information, see generally ALLEN &
OVERY, NEW INSOLVENCY PROCEDURES FOR BANKS AND BUILDING SOCIETIES (Apr. 2009),
available at http://elink.allenovery.com/getFile.aspx?ItemType=Bulletin&id=7b96101803c0-4691-8d86-c50f35954edd; LINKLATERS, THE BANKING ACT 2009 AND ITS IMPACT ON
UK BANKS AND THEIR STAKEHOLDERS AND COUNTERPARTIES (Mar. 9, 2009), available at
http://www.linexlegal.com/content.php?content_id=83703; SLAUGHTER AND MAY, A BRIEF
GUIDE TO THE BANKING ACT OF 2009 (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.
slaughterandmay.com/media/786586/financing_briefing_a_brief_guide_to_the_banking_act
_2008_mar_2009.pdf.
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aims to provide the U.K. government with new tools to deal with
failing banks and building societies. The Banking Act does not apply
to an investment bank and the U.K. government is currently
developing a separate resolution mechanism for investment banks.
Under the Banking Act, the FSA has the authority to trigger the
regime if a bank has failed or is likely to fail to meet certain FSAdefined threshold conditions. Once the SRR is triggered, the Bank
of England is responsible for managing and executing the resolution
process and the Treasury is responsible for some key decisions such
as financing or nationalization. Under the Banking Act, there are
three stabilization options: (i) the Bank of England has the power to
transfer all or part of a failing bank to a private sector purchaser; (ii)
the Bank of England has the power to transfer all or part of a failing
bank to a bridge bank established by the Bank of England; and (iii)
the Treasury may take a bank into temporary public ownership by
transferring its shares either to a nominee of the Treasury or a
company wholly owned by the Treasury. In the case of a partial
transfer, either to a private sector purchaser or a bridge bank, the
residual bank would be placed into a “special bank administration”
procedure, with the primary objective being to support the private
sector purchaser or the bridge bank. The Bank of England, in
conjunction with a bank administrator, executes the “special bank
administration” procedure.
Since the passage of the Banking Act, Dunfermline Building
Society was the first case under the SRR.155 Some part of
Dunfermline’s assets and liabilities was transferred to Nationwide
Building Society and some part was placed into a bridge bank,
wholly owned by the Bank of England. The assets and liabilities held
by the bridge bank were sold later in a competitive auction process.
The remainder of Dunfermline’s business was placed into the
“special bank administration” procedure.156
C. Other European Programs
The financial crisis has prompted actions from the European
Commission and many national governments. In the European
Union, all rescue packages by national governments are subject to

155. See HM TREASURY, REFORMING FINANCIAL MARKETS, CM 7667, 31 (2009),
available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/reforming_ financial_markets080709.pdf.
156. Id.
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the European Commission’s state aid review as part of the EU’s
competition policy.157 To allow swift implementation of national
measures, the European Commission issued a series of
Communications to provide a European framework of rescue
operations and streamline the approval procedures.158 The discussion
below is informed primarily by two recent BIS reports and provides
only a short summary of the various rescue programs instituted by
the major European nations.159
1. Capital injections160
All major European nations, including France, Germany, Italy,
Spain, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, established capital injection
schemes. The Italian and Spanish programs were not used because of
their relatively healthy banking sectors, which were less affected by
the financial crisis. The eligible institutions are typically depository
institutions, though the programs in France, Germany, and the
Netherlands also include insurance companies.

157. See, e.g., Europa.eu, Competition, http://europa.eu/pol/comp/index_en.htm (last
visited Jan. 15, 2010).
158. For more information, see Commission of the European Communities, COM (2009)
164 final (Aug. 4, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/
studies_reports/2009_spring_en.pdf;
Communication
from
the
Commission—The
Application of State Aid Rules to Measures Taken in Relation to Financial Institutions in the
Context of the Current Global Financial Crisis (EC) 25 Oct. 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 270) 8, 8–
14,
(the
Banking
Communication),
available
at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008XC1025(01):EN:NOT; Communication from
the Commission—The Recapitalisation of Financial Institutions in the Current Financial Crisis:
Limitation of Aid to the Minimum Necessary and Safeguards Against Undue Distortion of
Competition (EC) 15 Jan. 2009, 2009 O.J. (C 10) 2, 2–10 (the Recapitalization
Communication),
available
at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=CELEX:52009XC0115(01):EN:NOT; Communication from the Commission on the
Treatment of Impaired Assets in the Community Banking Sector (EC) 26 Mar. 2009, 2009
O.J. (C 72) 1, 1–22 (the Impaired Assets Communication), available at http:
//eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52009XC0326(01):EN:NOT;
Commission Communication on the Return to Viability and the Assessment of Restructuring
Measures in the Financial Sector in the Current Crisis Under the State Aid Rules (EC) 19 Aug.
2009, 2009 O.J. (C 195) 9, 9–20 (the Restructuring Communication), available at http:
//eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52009XC0819(03):EN:NOT.
159. See generally Fabio Panetta et al., An Assessment of Financial Sector Rescue
Programmes, (Bank for International Settlements, BIS Papers No. 48, July 2009) [hereinafter
BIS I], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap48.pdf?noframes=1; 2009 BANK
FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS ANN. REP. 79 [hereinafter BIS II], available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2009e.pdf?noframes=1.
160. See BIS I, supra note 159, at 20–22; BIS II, supra note 159, at 106–07.
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Most of the capital injections take the form of preferred shares
and, in the case of France, subordinated debt (which was later
allowed to be converted to preferred shares). In terms of pricing, the
annual dividend for preferred shares of the European programs was
set according to the guidelines by the European Central Bank,
ranging from 6–9.3% depending on the degree of subordination.
Similar to the U.S. programs, some EU programs also require
warrants for ordinary shares issued to governments to give them the
potential for upside returns. The capital injections all carry some
combination of restrictions in executive compensation, dividend
payments and adoption of appropriate business strategy or
restructuring plans.
2. Debt guarantees161
Debt guarantee programs were also adopted in almost all
European countries. The programs applied to domestic banks, and
most of them also cover domestic subsidiaries of foreign banks. The
eligible instruments are mostly newly issued senior unsecured debt
with maturity terms usually ranging from three to five years. Some
programs also cover shorter-term instruments such as certificates of
deposit and commercial papers, but other programs explicitly
exclude very short-term liabilities.
In terms of cost, most EU programs are linked to the issuers’
median credit default swap (CDS) spreads over some historical
period. By comparison, the United States’ TLGP charges a flat fee
that varies with maturity. Apart from debt guarantee programs, some
European countries also increased their deposit insurance coverage,
either temporarily or permanently, such as Germany, Italy, and
Switzerland.
3. Asset guarantees162
In comparison to programs for capital injections and debt
guarantees that have been adopted in nearly all countries, asset
guarantee programs have been rare. Apart from the Asset Protection
Scheme in the United Kingdom, there is only one stand-alone case

161. See BIS I, supra note 159, at 23–25; BIS II, supra note 159, at 103, 106.
162. See BIS I, supra note 159, at 10–11, 26–27; BIS II, supra note 159, at 107.
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in Europe—namely, the Dutch guarantee of certain assets held by
ING.
4. Asset purchases163
Asset purchase programs are even scarcer in Europe. So far, only
Germany has announced a general program to purchase impaired
assets. In Germany, a draft law from May 2009 authorized the
establishment of a new facility to swap toxic assets from banks for
government-guaranteed bonds, but the program has not yet been
implemented.
Though not part of a general program, the Swiss National Bank
purchased $38.7 billion of toxic assets from UBS Switzerland and
placed them into an SPV. Most of the purchased assets were U.S.
real estate related. The Swiss National Bank provided 90% of the
financing in the form of secured lending and UBS provided the rest
in the form of equity and agreed to take the first loss on these assets.
5. Bank insolvency laws and nationalizations
The financial crisis exposed the constraints of the national bank
insolvency regimes, prompting many EU countries to pass or
consider legislation to institute special resolution regimes for banks
and other financial institutions.164 Before the financial crisis, most
EU national governments did not have laws on their books allowing
them to take over failing banks. As mentioned above, the U.K.
government passed the legislation for a special bank resolution
regime (SRR) in response to its experiences of dealing with the crisis
of Northern Rock. The near-collapse of Hypo Real Estate Holding
AG prompted the German government to pass a special legislation
primarily for the purpose of taking over that failing institution.
Currently, the German government is debating whether a special
bank insolvency procedure should be put in place that would apply
generally to all banks.165
163. See BIS I, supra note 159, at 25–26; BIS II, supra note 159, at 107.
164. See Matthew Dalton, Europeans Review Bank Rules, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2009,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124757731423738667.html.
165. See Geoffrey T. Smith, Germany to Create New Power to Take Over Insolvent Banks,
Aug.
6,
2009,
available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/
WALL ST. J.,
SB124950875633709055.html; Andrea Thomas, BaFin’s Sanio Calls for FDIC-like Body For
Germany, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB124895957063693663.html.
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In the case of Fortis, the Dutch government had the legal
authority to take over the Dutch arm of Fortis and used it to
nationalize it after an initial capital injection failed to stabilize the
bank. In comparison, the Belgian government, however, did not
have such powers, which complicated its handling of the Belgian arm
of Fortis, as the shareholders were able to block a governmentorchestrated sale of Fortis’s Belgian banking assets to BNP Paribas
SA for more than six months.166 In light of the Fortis experience, the
Belgian government is also drafting legislation for a special bank
resolution regime.
6. European Central Bank (ECB)167
Since October 2008, the ECB cut its key policy rate by a total of
325 basis points to a historical low of 1%. Because of the euro area’s
largely bank-centered financial system, the ECB’s actions to provide
liquidity focused mostly on the banking sector.168 Similar to the
actions of central banks in the United States and United Kingdom,
the ECB relaxed standards for eligible collateral, expanded
counterparty coverage, and lengthened the maturity of refinancing
operations from one week to six months. Instead of competitive
auctioning for a given amount of credit as during normal times, the
ECB followed a “fixed rate full allotment” procedure, essentially
granting banks unlimited liquidity.
With respect to asset purchases, the ECB’s asset purchase
program is minimal with a total commitment of €60 billion. Eligible
assets include only covered bonds.

166. See Jan Brockmeijer, Deputy Dir., IMF Monetary and Capital Markets Dep’t, Lessons
of the Crisis for EU Financial Supervisory Policy, Remarks at the IMF-Bruegel-National Bank of
Belgium Conference: After the Storm: The Future Face of Europe’s Financial System (Mar.
24, 2009), available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2009/eurfin/pdf/
brockm.pdf.
167. See Jean-Claude Trichet, President, European Cent. Bank, Supporting the Financial
System and the Economy: Key ECB Policy Actions in the Crisis, Speech at the Nueva Economía
Fórum-Wall Street Journal Europe Conference (June 22, 2009), available at
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2009/html/sp090622.en.html.
168. President Trichet stated that the Euro financial system is largely bank-centered,
whereas the U.S. system is more market-based. At the end of 2007, total outstanding bank
loans to the private sector amounted to about 145% of GDP in the euro area, while the
corresponding figure for bank loans in the U.S. is only 63%. See id.
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III. REGULATORY REFORM DESIGNED TO PREVENT FUTURE CRISES
The U.S. and international regulatory proposals designed to
prevent future financial crises, or at least reduce their likelihood or
severity, are still in the process of being formed and discussed. I will
summarize the current U.S., U.K., and other European proposals, as
well as the G-20 proposals for worldwide financial regulatory reform.
A. U.S. Proposals
The financial crisis has created a perfect storm for more
regulation in the United States. Many U.S. regulators and
policymakers have stressed the lack of adequate regulatory or
supervisory powers as one of the causes of the global financial crisis.
As a result, there have been various proposals from the Obama
Administration, from Democrats and Republicans in the U.S.
Congress, and from other stakeholders, for how the financial
regulatory system in the United States should be reformed or
overhauled to prevent a future crisis from occurring, or at least
reduce its likelihood or severity.
1. Alleged flaws in the U.S. financial oversight system
Among the alleged flaws in the U.S. financial oversight system
that contributed to the financial crisis is the criticism that there are
too many regulators in the United States with overlapping, and in
some cases insufficiently overlapping, jurisdictions and mandates.169
It is true that, as a result of historical development rather than
national planning, a single financial institution in the United States
can find itself subject to the jurisdiction of a wide swath of regulators
by business subsidiary and across business lines, and that different
financial institutions can find themselves subject to differing
regulation depending on historical circumstance. This can lead to
inefficiencies in regulation, can provide opportunities for regulatory
arbitrage, and can result in regulators pointing fingers at each other
when the system goes awry.
In fact, one of the main criticisms of the system is that no single
regulator was responsible for overseeing risk within the financial
system as a whole.170 No single regulator, or collection of
169. Joe Nocera, Knee Jerks for Reform Are Overdue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2008, at C1.
170. It’s the Regulations, Not the Regulator, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at A30.
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coordinated regulators, had the authority or the resources to collect
information system-wide or to use that information to take corrective
action in a timely manner across financial institutions and markets
regardless of charter. For example, one of the lessons learned from
recent experience is that a sector of the market, such as the mortgage
brokerage industry, can be systemically important, even though no
single institution in that sector is a significant player. A single
regulator with responsibility for overseeing systemic risk could
identify and move to regulate such a sector.
Finally, the current system provides no authority designed to
empower a federal regulatory agency to control the resolution of a
financial institution during a financial crisis, leaving the choice as
between a so-called “bailout,” and allowing the institution to fail and
file for bankruptcy, as occurred with Lehman Brothers.171
These and other alleged flaws in the current system have
amplified the calls for reform of the current regulatory system.
2. Four models for financial regulatory reform
Generally speaking, there are four global models for financial
regulation: (1) institutional regulation, where supervision is based on
the type of entity, such as a bank, insurance company, broker-dealer,
etc.; (2) functional regulation, where supervision is based on
function, such as securities activities, insurance, banking, investment
advice, etc.; (3) a “twin peaks” model of regulation, where there is a
separation of supervisory functions between two separate regulators,
one which is responsible for prudential supervision, and the other
which is responsible for conduct-of-business supervision; and (4) an
integrated model of regulation, such as exists in the United
Kingdom with the Financial Services Authority, where a single
comprehensive supervisor is responsible for all the sectors of financial
services business.172
The United States financial regulatory system has been
characterized as an “institutionally based functional system” with
171. Edmund L. Andrews & Eric Dash, U.S. Seeks Expanded Power in Seizing Firms, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 2009, at A1.
172. See U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL
REGULATORY STRUCTURE (Mar. 2008) [hereinafter U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, BLUEPRINT],
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf; GROUP OF THIRTY,
FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY (Jan. 2009), available at
http://www.group30.org/pubs/reformreport.pdf.
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separate regulatory agencies broadly responsible for regulatory
oversight across functional lines, such as banking, insurance,
securities and futures.173 Historically, these functions may have been
housed in separate institutions, but with the passage of the GrammLeach-Bliley Act and other market developments, these functions are
increasingly housed in a variety of institutions and within single
institutions. The tension for financial regulatory reform in the
United States is between making fundamental changes to this
regulatory model, and making changes within the regulatory model
as it currently exists.
3. Obama Administration’s financial regulatory reform plan
In June 2009, contemporaneously with increasingly loud calls for
regulatory reform and domestic and international pressure to address
some of the causes of the financial crisis, the U.S. Treasury released
its White Paper on Financial Regulatory Reform.174 In addition to
identifying specific areas for reform, the White Paper identified five
key objectives for financial regulation: (1) to protect consumers and
investors from financial abuse; (2) to promote robust supervision and
regulation of financial firms; (3) to establish comprehensive
regulation of financial markets; (4) to provide the government with
the tools it needs to manage financial crises; and (5) to raise
international regulatory standards and improve international
cooperation.
The extent to which the White Paper’s conceptual proposals, and
subsequent legislation proposed by the Obama Administration to
implement those proposals,175 achieve these goals is a matter of
considerable debate. Roughly speaking, the proposals can be placed

173. See U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, BLUEPRINT, supra note 172.
174. U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL
SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (June 2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/
docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf. For a memorandum analyzing the White Paper, see DAVIS
POLK, A NEW FOUNDATION FOR FINANCIAL REGULATION? (June 2009), available at
http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/726890c9-123c-4113-a924-a129bc96fbce/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/d1bbea9e-1369-49a5-838f-c83e8f4fae1b/062209_
New_Foundation.pdf.
175. For a discussion of the Obama Administration’s initial financial regulatory proposals,
see DAVIS POLK, THE REGULATORY REFORM MARATHON (July 2009), available at
http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/963cb101-2593-4ba0-9133-02f73afd2bd9/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/bfcca243-1cf2-47b6-81fb-0a23756a927c/072809_
Marathon.pdf.

463

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

4/26/2010 8:05 PM

2010

into four categories: (1) supervision and regulation of financial firms;
(2) comprehensive regulation of financial markets; (3) consumer and
investor protection; and (4) executive compensation and corporate
governance. I will provide an overview of these proposals below. For
a timeline of the political and regulatory responses, see Annex B.176
a. Supervision and regulation of financial firms. Reform to the
supervision and regulation of financial firms is a keystone of the
Obama Administration’s proposals for comprehensive financial
regulatory reform. These proposals include appointing the Federal
Reserve as the systemic risk regulator in the United States,
supplemented by a Council of Regulators; regulating systemically
important financial institutions, or so-called “Tier 1 FHCs”;
enhancing the capital and prudential standards for existing bank
holding companies, and bringing previously exempted bank holding
companies under the Federal Reserve’s supervision; providing for
authority to resolve systemically significant financial institutions;
regulating hedge funds; reforming the regulation of credit agencies;
and creating an Office of National Insurance.
(1) Systemic risk regulator. Reflecting the consensus among
most U.S. policymakers that the U.S. financial regulatory
architecture needs a systemic regulator, the centerpiece of the U.S.
Treasury’s proposal involves the creation of a single independent
regulator with responsibility over systemically important firms and
critical payment and settlement systems.177
One of the key policy disagreements in the domestic debate
revolves around the role of the Federal Reserve as the sole or lead
systemic risk regulator. The Administration’s proposal reflects its
decision to make the Federal Reserve solely responsible and
accountable for systemic risk regulation and supervision, with
assistance from a Financial Services Oversight Council. Many
commentators and policy makers have long thought that the Federal
Reserve is the only institution that has the experience and capacity to
be the systemic risk regulator. The Bush Administration’s Treasury
took this position in its Blueprint for a Modernized Financial
Regulatory Structure, stating that “[t]he Federal Reserve should

176. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 5.
177. U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, BLUEPRINT, supra note 172, at 144.
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assume this role in the optimal framework given its traditional central
bank role of promoting overall macroeconomic stability.”178
This aspect of the proposed legislation has had many critics,
including U.S. Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher
Dodd, FDIC Chairman Bair, and SEC Chairman Schapiro. Some of
these critics expressed concern about concentrating too much power
in the hands of the Federal Reserve and reducing the influence of
other federal agencies such as the FDIC and the SEC.179 Many of
these critics would place systemic risk authority in the hands of a
council made up of a variety of federal regulators, including the SEC
and the FDIC. The House Republicans would go a step further and
transfer the Federal Reserve’s current regulatory authority to a new
single financial institutions regulator, while limiting the Federal
Reserve’s mission to monetary policy.
Recently, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke,
acknowledging these critics and their political clout, has stated that,
although for purposes of both effectiveness and accountability, the
consolidated supervision of an individual firm, whether or not it is
systemically important, is best vested with a single agency, the
broader task of monitoring and addressing systemic risks that might
arise from the interaction of different types of financial institutions
and markets should be incorporated into the mandate of each
individual agency and should be the mandate of an oversight council,
composed of representatives of the agencies and departments
involved in the oversight of the financial sector.180
How this debate over the systemic risk regulator will be resolved
is yet to be determined, but it is clear that the Administration
intends to push for the Federal Reserve to be the regulator of
systemically important financial firms.
(2) Tier 1 FHCs. The regulation and consolidated
supervision of systemically important financial institutions is another
key element of the Obama Administration’s regulatory reform
proposals. The current financial crisis demonstrated that banks and

178. Id.
179. Stephen Labaton, An Overhaul of Financial Rules Is Taking Shape, N.Y. TIMES,
June 1, 2009, at B1.
180. See Federal Reserve Perspectives on Financial Regulatory Reform Proposals: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Ben Bernanke,
Chairman of the Federal Reserve), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/testimony/bernanke20091001a.htm.
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bank holding companies are not the only financial institutions that
can create systemic risk if they fail. Other financial firms—such as
investment banks or insurance companies—can also create systemic
risk if they fail. Yet these other financial institutions have not been
subject to the same sort of regulation and consolidated supervision in
the United States as banks and bank holding companies. To close
this gap in the regulatory structure, the Administration has proposed
subjecting all systemically important financial institutions to the same
framework for consolidated prudential supervision that currently
applies to bank holding companies. Such action would prevent
financial firms that do not own a bank, but that nonetheless pose
risks to the overall financial system because of the size, risks, or
interconnectedness of their financial activities, from avoiding
comprehensive supervisory oversight.
The Administration’s legislative proposal would define a new
category of financial institutions called “Tier 1 FHCs.” A Tier 1
FHC would be any “United States financial company” or “foreign
financial company” that is designated as a Tier 1 FHC by the Federal
Reserve. A “United States financial company” would be a “bank
holding company or any other company” organized under U.S. law
that is engaged “in whole, or in part, directly or indirectly,” in
“activities in the United States that are financial in nature,”
regardless of whether the company owns or controls a bank.181 A
“foreign financial company” would be a “bank holding company or
any other company” organized under non-U.S. law that is engaged
in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, including through a U.S.
branch, in “activities in the United States that are financial in
nature.”182 These definitions would give the Federal Reserve broad
discretion to designate almost any large, highly leveraged or
interconnected company as a Tier 1 FHC, provided it is engaged in
at least some financial activities. Only a company that is exclusively
engaged in nonfinancial activities is entirely insulated from being
designated as a Tier 1 FHC. The proposed legislation would
establish standards that are more stringent than those applicable to
bank holding companies and would include stricter risk-based capital

181. Title II, Obama Administration Legislative Proposal, available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/title%20ii%20tier%201%20fhcs%20%20722200
9%20fnl.pdf.
182. Id.
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requirements, leverage limits, liquidity requirements, and overall risk
management requirements.183
Critics have argued that designating firms as systemically
important, or “Tier 1 FHCs,” will institutionalize them as “too big
to fail,” creating another class of institutions like Freddie Mac and
Fannie Mae that have funding advantages over their competitors
because of the implicit support of the U.S. government. The
Administration has responded by arguing that any funding
advantages will be offset by the costs of enhanced capital, liquidity
and other requirements that will be imposed on Tier 1 FHCs, and
that it is not possible to impose these enhanced requirements on
systemically important institutions unless there is some mechanism
for identifying who they are. Moreover, the Administration has
argued that imposing the enhanced requirements will reduce the
incentives to becoming too large. Finally, the creation of an orderly
resolution mechanism for these large, non-bank holding companies
would also address the “too big to fail” problem.184
(3) Capital and prudential standards for BHCs. In addition
to subjecting systemically important financial institutions to
consolidated supervision and regulation by the Federal Reserve,
regardless of their charter, the Administration has proposed
consolidating certain U.S. bank supervisors, eliminating the ability of
certain “non-bank” bank holding companies to remain exempt from
bank holding company regulation, and enhancing the capital and
prudential standards applicable to all bank holding companies.
As noted at the outset, one of the perceived flaws of the U.S.
financial regulatory system is the number of regulators with similar
mandates and exceptions to regulation due to historical
circumstance. In an effort to address some of that inefficiency, the
Administration has proposed consolidating the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, which oversees national banks, and the
Office of Thrift Supervision, which oversees national savings
associations, into a single regulator, the National Bank Supervisor.185
In addition, certain insured depository institutions that do not
currently fall within the definition of the term “bank” for the
183. DAVIS POLK, REGULATORY REFORM MARATHON, supra note 175, at 3.
184. Id. at 2.
185. Title VI, Obama Administration Legislative Proposal, available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/title%20vi%20bhca%20amndts%20%200722%2
0fnl.pdf.
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purpose of bank holding company regulation, such as savings
associations, industrial loan companies, credit card banks, trust
companies, and grandfathered non-bank banks, would be included
with a new definition of the term “bank.” Their parent holding
companies would therefore become bank holding companies and
would be required to conform their activities to the non-banking
activity restrictions of the Bank Holding Company Act or to divest
control over such depository institution subsidiaries.186 With these
reforms, the Administration is attempting to move financial
regulation closer to a rational, more streamlined system.
The Administration has also focused on enhancing capital and
prudential standards for all bank holding companies. A U.S. Treasury
working group will publish a report on capital requirements by
December 31, 2009. This is occurring in the context of a review by
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision of capital
requirements. The Basel Committee released a complete proposal by
the end of 2009.187 The U.S. Treasury has called for reaching an
international agreement on a new global capital framework by
December 31, 2010, with implementation by December 31,
2012.188
Some of the U.S. capital reform proposals include making
common equity a large majority of a banking firm’s Tier 1 capital,
and limiting the amount of cumulative or non-cumulative perpetual
preferred stock and qualifying trust preferred securities that can be
included in Tier 1 capital. In addition, higher risk-based capital
charges for certain instruments and exposures, such as off-balance
sheet vehicles, proprietary and other trading positions, equity
investments, asset-backed securities and mortgage-backed securities,
and counterparty credit risk exposures to financial firms (e.g., noncentrally cleared derivatives, repos, reverse repos, securities lending,
and margin loans), could be proposed. Other proposals are to apply
higher capital requirements in the early phases of the credit cycle, to
apply more uniform capital requirements throughout the cycle, and
to require forward-looking loan loss reserves. U.S. bank regulators

186. Id.
187. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Strengthening the Resilience of the
Banking Sector (Dec. 2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.pdf?noframes=1.
188. U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, PRINCIPLES FOR REFORMING THE U.S. AND
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CAPITAL FRAMEWORK FOR BANKING FIRMS, (Sept. 2009),
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/capital-statement_090309.pdf.
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and Treasury are debating whether to impose a capital surcharge on
systemically important firms. Specific quantitative proposals for these
charges and requirements have yet to be announced.
(4) Resolution of systemically important financial institutions.
One of the deficiencies identified in the recent financial crisis was the
lack of authority by any federal regulatory agency to resolve a
systemically important financial institution, such as Lehman Brothers
or AIG, other than to allow the institution to file for bankruptcy.
Those who view this lack of authority as a deficiency believe that
allowing a systemically important financial institution to file for
bankruptcy can result in systemic risk to the financial system. They
believe that a regime that empowers a federal agency to direct the
orderly resolution of failing, systemically important financial firms
would be an improvement.
The proposed resolution authority is modeled on the special
resolution law used by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to
resolve insured banks and thrifts. Its proponents believe that it would
provide the government with a mechanism for imposing losses on
the shareholders and creditors of the firm. For example, Chairman
Bernanke has stated that establishing a credible process for imposing
such losses is essential to restoring a meaningful degree of market
discipline and addressing the too-big-to-fail problem. The availability
of a workable resolution regime would also replace the need for the
Federal Reserve to use its emergency lending authority under section
13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to prevent the failure of specific
institutions.
Currently, the proposal would place the FDIC or, in certain
circumstances, the SEC, in charge of the resolution process.
Potentially covered companies include any Tier 1 FHC, any bank
holding company and any of their subsidiaries (other than an insured
depository institution subsidiary, a broker-dealer subsidiary that is a
member of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC),
or an insurance company subsidiary). These other subsidiaries would
be resolved under their existing insolvency regimes.189 Thus, while
the proposed authority would have authorized a federal agency to
resolve the holding companies and many of the subsidiaries in the
Lehman Brothers or AIG groups, it would not have included the
189. Title XII, Obama Administration Proposed Legislation, available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/title-XII_resolutionauthority_0723
09.pdf.
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authority over those entire groups because the flagship broker-dealer
in the Lehman Brothers group and every insurance subsidiary in the
AIG group (accounting for the vast majority of the group’s assets
and liabilities) would have been excluded from coverage.
Moreover, there are significant issues raised by this proposal. The
proposal would change the “rules of the game” for creditors and
counterparties on the eve of bankruptcy and thereby disrupt their
reasonable expectations with little or no prior notice. Creditors,
counterparties, customers, and other stakeholders have very different
rights under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act, and changing the rules of the game on the eve of
bankruptcy could itself create systemic risk. This problem may be
addressed by harmonizing the rules that define creditors’ rights in
the proposed resolution authority with their counterparts under the
Bankruptcy Code. This would leave a federal agency in charge of the
process with the conservatorship and bridge company options, but
otherwise applying many of the substantive rules defining creditors’
rights as they currently exist in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
(5) Hedge funds. For a variety of reasons, the regulation of
hedge funds and hedge fund advisers has become a main target of
regulatory reform. Although hedge funds are not widely thought to
have been a cause of the current financial crisis, the lack of
transparency into their operations and their capacity to cause
systemic risk, as demonstrated by the losses incurred by Long Term
Capital Management in the late 1990s, has drawn scrutiny and
persistent calls from Congress, foreign supervisors, and the public to
require hedge fund advisers to register.190 Moreover, hedge funds
have become direct competitors with banks and securities firms in
many aspects of their businesses.
The Administration has proposed to amend the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 to require nearly all advisers to hedge funds
and other private pools of capital to register with the SEC.191 The
proposed legislation would not require funds themselves to register,
but would require advisers to private funds to report to the SEC, on

190. See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONGTERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2001).
191. See DAVIS POLK, PRIVATE FUND INVESTMENT ADVISERS REGISTRATION ACT (July
2009), available at http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/42b233ac-70fd-44f09a0c06780d656923/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/b821d55d-fd30-4d1b-85b506a0
aba19d04/07.17.09.PFIRA.html.
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a confidential basis, information about the funds they advise to
permit an assessment of systemic risk posed by the funds.
The proposal would eliminate the exemption for private
investment advisers and require all advisers to “private funds” to
register with the SEC if their assets under management exceed $30
million. The definition of “private fund” does not distinguish
between hedge funds and other private funds, such as venture capital
and private equity funds. The proposal does create a new exemption
for a “foreign private adviser.” The proposal would require that an
offshore adviser have no place of business in the United States in
order to qualify for the exemption. Furthermore, the exemption
would require not only that the foreign adviser’s U.S. clients number
less than fifteen but also that the adviser manage less than $25
million attributable to U.S. clients.
Registered investment advisers that are subject to the Advisers
Act are required to implement a comprehensive compliance
program, adopt a code of ethics and an insider trading policy,
comply with certain custody procedures, advertising restrictions and
document retention obligations, disclose and report specified
information on Form ADV, and be subject to SEC examinations.
The proposed legislation would authorize the SEC to require
registered investment advisers to provide reports regarding private
funds they advise “as are necessary or appropriate in the public
interest and for the assessment of systemic risk”192 and to provide
such reports to the Federal Reserve as well as to the Financial
Services Oversight Council. The Administration has stated that
during the financial crisis the government lacked the data necessary
to monitor private fund activity, and that the proposal would require
advisers to private funds to report information necessary to assess
“whether risks in the aggregate or risks in any particular fund pose a
threat to our overall financial stability.”193 The reports required by
the proposed legislation would include assets under management,
use of leverage (including off-balance sheet leverage), counterparty

192. Title IV, § 404, Obama Administration Legislative Proposal, available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/title%20iv%20reg%20advisers%20priv%20fun
ds%207%2015%2009%20fnl.pdf.
193. Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep’t, Administration’s Regulatory Reform Agenda
Moves Forward, TG 214 (July 15, 2009), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/
press/releases/tg214.htm.
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credit risk exposure, trading and investment positions, trading
practices, and other information as determined by the SEC.194
Representative Paul E. Kanjorski, Chairman of the House
Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and
Government Sponsored Enterprises, recently proposed legislation to
amend the Advisers Act similar to the Administration’s proposed
legislation, except that it would exempt investment advisers to
venture capital funds from registration requirements and enhance the
SEC’s rulemaking authority in this area.195 House Financial Services
Committee Chairman Barney Frank has said that he plans to
introduce legislation imposing restrictions on hedge funds, private
equity firms, and broker-dealers while exempting venture capital
firms from additional regulations as well.196
(6) Credit rating agencies. Among the many weaknesses
identified as contributing to the financial crisis was the conduct of
credit rating agencies, which were blamed for not adequately or
accurately identifying credit risk in their securities ratings. Regulatory
initiatives are currently under way to improve the integrity of the
rating agencies’ rating process. These initiatives have focused on
enhancing the transparency of the rating process through greater
disclosure of rating agencies’ procedures and methodologies and
strengthening rules addressing conflicts of interest.
On July 14, 2009, SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro announced a plan
to create a new entity within the SEC whose sole purpose is to
oversee and examine credit-rating agencies. On September 17,
2009, the SEC held an open meeting on measures to strengthen
the oversight of credit rating agencies. At the meeting, the SEC
voted unanimously to take several rulemaking actions, including
the adoption of amendments designed to reduce reliance on credit
ratings by eliminating references to nationally recognized statistical
rating organization (NRSRO) ratings from certain SEC rules and

194. DAVIS POLK, supra note 191.
195. See Davis Polk, Representative Kanjorski Releases Investor Protection, Private
Investment Fund Advisers Registration and Federal Insurance Office Proposals, Oct. 6, 2009,
http://intranet.dpw.com/intranet/SS/depts/busdev/Communications%20by%20Type/All%
20Client%20Communications/2009/100609_Kanjorski.pdf.
196. See Frank to Propose Hedge-fund Regulation Bill, MARKETWATCH, Oct. 1, 2009,
available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/frank-to-propose-hedge-fund-regulationbill-2009-10-01.
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forms.197 Also adopted were rules to provide investors with greater
information concerning ratings history and to promote unsolicited
ratings by providing all NRSROs with equal access to data
underlying structured finance products. The SEC also proposed
rules that would enhance credit rating agencies’ compliance
programs, further eliminate references to NRSRO ratings from
SEC rules and forms, and require additional disclosure about the
meaningfulness of ratings and the potential existence of revenuerelated conflicts of interest. In addition, legislation proposed by the
U.S. Treasury would require registration of all credit rating
agencies as NRSROs, further enhance the SEC’s supervision of
credit rating agencies, and impose investor protection
requirements. However, critics have been vocal in their assertions
that the current initiatives do not go far enough. They have
suggested further-reaching initiatives, such as requiring rating
agencies to perform their own due diligence to verify information
presented to them by issuers and exposing rating agencies to
meaningful legal liability risks. The SEC has actively engaged such
critics and recently voted to issue a concept release considering
whether to subject NRSROs to liability when their ratings are used
in connection with a registered offering.198

(7) Office of national insurance. Many regulators and
commentators have endorsed the concept of a national insurance
regulator, noting that “[j]ust as the state/federal banking system
works well for the industry and the economy—so too can a similar
insurance system.”199 In congressional testimony, U.S. Treasury
Secretary Timothy Geithner has said that “there is a good case for

197. The Federal Reserve recently announced that it has proposed a rule that would
establish criteria to determine the NRSROs whose ratings are accepted for the TALF program.
The proposed rule, which would require a certain minimum level of experience in rating deals
of any particular type, would likely result in an expansion of TALF-eligible NRSROs. The
proposal is intended to promote competition among NRSROs and ensure appropriate
protection against credit risk for the U.S. taxpayer. Press Release, Fed. Reserve (Oct. 5, 2009),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20091005b.htm.
198. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 172–73 (citations omitted).
199. See Statement of the Honorable Steve Bartlett, President and Chief Executive
Officer, The Financial Services Roundtable, Before the House Financial Services Subcommittee
on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, U.S. House of
Representatives, (Mar. 5, 2009), available at http://www.fsround.org/media/pdfs/
Roundtable_HFSC_030509_final.pdf.
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introducing an optional federal charter for insurance companies.”200
However, due to political and historical roadblocks, it has been very
difficult to move away from the current system of fifty-state
regulation or to supplement it with an optional federal insurance
charter.
As a compromise, the Administration has proposed an Office of
National Insurance within the U.S. Treasury which, while not an
optional federal regulator, would have real, albeit limited, powers
and could portend increased federal involvement in the insurance
industry.201 The Office of National Insurance would monitor all
aspects of the insurance industry, including identifying regulatory
issues or gaps in the regulation of insurers that could contribute to a
systemic crisis in the insurance industry or the U.S. financial system.
It could recommend to the Federal Reserve that it designate an
insurer, including its affiliates, as a Tier 1 FHC. The scope of the
Office of National Insurance’s powers would extend to all lines of
insurance except health insurance. In order to serve its functions, it
would be given authority, with subpoena powers, to collect
information from insurers (of a threshold size) and their affiliates, in
coordination with the applicable state regulator (or regulatory
agency).
It would also provide a much needed voice on international
issues. The Office of National Insurance would coordinate federal
efforts and establish federal policy on prudential aspects of
international insurance matters. The proposal provides the U.S.
Treasury Secretary with the explicit authority to negotiate and enter
into international insurance agreements on prudential measures.
Currently, representatives from fifty-six U.S. jurisdictions as well as
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners participate in
International Association of Insurance Supervisors activities, which
can complicate the development of a uniform U.S. perspective on
insurance matters.
b. Comprehensive regulation of financial markets. The
comprehensive regulation of financial markets is a key element of the
Administration’s regulatory reform agenda. The perception that
over-the-counter derivatives and credit default swaps were
200. Reuters, Consumer Group to Geithner: Don’t Use Financial Overhaul to Deregulate
Insurance, Mar. 31, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/
idUS208225+31-Mar-2009+PRN20090331.
201. See U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, BLUEPRINT, supra note 172, at 10–11.
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inadequately regulated and contributed to the accumulation of
systemic risk has led to calls for reform in those areas. Moreover,
inadequate oversight and supervision of the securitization market was
another area perceived to have contributed to excessive levels of debt
leverage which exacerbated the housing bubble.
(1) No SEC-CFTC merger; regulation of OTC derivatives.
One of the obvious areas for financial regulatory reform would have
been to merge the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission with
the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission. However, the
political realities make this logical rationalization impossible to
achieve. As a result, and in response to public pressure, the SEC and
the CFTC have focused on how to harmonize futures and securities
regulation. The Chairmen of the SEC and the CFTC have recently
announced that the two agencies expect to issue a report by October
15, 2009, that will address the key areas in which their regulatory
schemes are different, and recommend legislative and regulatory
actions to address those differences where appropriate.202
In addition, the Administration has proposed sweeping
legislation that for the first time would subject the over-the-counter
(OTC) derivatives markets, OTC derivatives dealers, derivativesclearing organizations and agencies, swap repositories, and major
non-dealer participants to comprehensive regulation.203 The
proposed legislation will have major consequences for the OTC
derivatives markets, dealers and participants, as well as for the CFTC
and SEC. It represents a significant policy reversal from the
Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000, legislation that
essentially shielded the OTC derivatives market from pervasive
regulation.
Remarkably, given concerns over regulatory fragmentation, the
proposed legislation would divide primary regulatory and supervisory
authority for derivatives among the CFTC, SEC and, in some
instances, federal bank regulators. The CFTC and SEC would jointly
adopt most rules implementing the proposed legislation and, in
some cases, would be required to do so in consultation with federal

202. Press Release, SEC and CFTC Chairmen Issue Update on Harmonization Report
(Sept. 30, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-211.htm.
203. Davis Polk, Obama Administration Proposes Sweeping Legislation to Regulate OverThe-Counter Derivatives, Aug. 17, 2009, http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/
5a453323-3f01-4885-aede-07938800eedd/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/f08f8b6e35a8-4ad8-88e4-8b9c697e5672/08.17.09.Obama.Derivatives.html.
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bank regulators. The proposed legislation would also require that
“standardized” OTC derivatives be cleared by a derivatives clearing
organization regulated by the CFTC or a securities clearing agency
regulated by the SEC, and that all OTC derivatives that are centrally
cleared be traded on a CFTC- or SEC-regulated exchange or a
regulated alternative swap execution facility.
The proposed legislation would establish regimes for the
registration and regulation by the CFTC and the SEC of a wide array
of new entities, including derivatives dealers and major derivatives
participants, swap repositories, security-based swap repositories,
clearing organizations and agencies, and alternative swap execution
facilities (under both the Commodity Exchange Act and the
Exchange Act), and would also expand considerably the
requirements applicable to CFTC-regulated derivatives clearing
organizations.
The CFTC and SEC would share certain aspects of regulatory
authority with the federal bank regulators who would have
prudential oversight over derivatives dealers and major derivatives
participants that are banks, and branches or agencies of foreign
banks, and, for purposes of setting capital requirements, bank
holding companies. In most cases, rulemaking and interpretations
would be jointly promulgated by both the CFTC and SEC, and the
federal bank regulators would have rulemaking authority with
respect to margin, capital, and prudential rules with respect to the
entities they regulate.
Importantly, regulators would be required to impose and enforce
higher capital requirements for OTC derivatives that are not centrally
cleared. The proposed legislation would permit, but not require,
federal bank regulators to prescribe margin requirements for certain
hedging counterparties that are not predominantly engaged in
financial activities and are not derivatives dealers or major derivatives
participants. The capital and margin requirements set by the federal
bank regulators would serve as a floor for capital and margin
requirements set by the CFTC and SEC and for capital requirements
set by the Federal Reserve for bank holding companies and Tier 1
FHCs. The CFTC and SEC would be required to set capital and
margin requirements for non-bank derivatives dealers and non-bank
major derivatives participants that are “as strict or stricter” than
those set by federal bank regulators for derivatives dealers and major
derivatives participants that are banks. Harmonization of CFTC and
476
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SEC regulations is sought by requiring the two agencies to prescribe
requirements that treat “functionally or economically similar
products” similarly.
On October 2, 2009, House Financial Services Committee
Chairman Barney Frank released a discussion draft for OTC
derivatives reform. The draft bill builds on the Administration’s
proposed legislation, adding regulation in some areas and softening a
number of key provisions, most importantly the clearing and
exchange trading requirements and exclusions for end users.204
(2) Systemically important payment, clearing, and settlement
systems. Payment, clearing, and settlement systems may be the least
romantic portion of the U.S. financial system. Yet it is hard to
imagine any segment of the U.S. financial system that has the
potential to be more systemically important. If any major operator of
one of these systems failed or experienced a serious disruption,
financial transactions around the country and the globe could grind
to a halt.
One way to measure their systemic importance is to consider the
mindboggling volumes of transactions that the operators of some of
these systems process. According to data posted on the Federal
Reserve’s Web site, the average volume of dollar transfers processed
by the Fedwire Funds Transfer System was approximately $3 trillion
per day in 2008.205 Assuming 250 business days per year, that
translates into $750 trillion per year. Yet only a fraction of the dollar
payments made through the U.S. and international banking systems
are processed through Fedwire. A substantial and largely
unmeasurable volume of additional transactions is processed on the
books of banks themselves or directly between correspondent banks,
without going through Fedwire.
The securities settlement system processes similar volumes of
securities transactions. According to data posted on the Federal
Reserve’s Web site, the average volume of U.S. government and
agency securities transactions processed by the Fedwire Securities
204. For a comparison of the Administration’s proposed legislation and Rep. Frank’s
draft bill, and a discussion of the main differences between the proposals, see Davis Polk,
Representative Frank Releases Discussion Draft for Over-the-Counter Derivatives Reform,
Oct. 6, 2009, http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/a68e3628-9fa6-4c1d-9b920f71dfc754d8/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/5a6ee725-a3b8-4588-b63e-1108df071
367/100609_frank_deriv.pdf.
205. Federal Reserve, Fedwire Funds Service—Annual Data, http://www.federalreserve.
gov/paymentsystems/files/fedfunds_ann.txt (last visited April 2, 2010).
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Service was $1.6 trillion per day or $419 trillion per year in 2008.206
Similarly, the Depository Trust Company, the principal U.S.
securities settlement system for U.S. corporate securities, reported
processing $455 trillion of securities transactions in 2008.207 A
substantial, and largely unmeasurable, volume of additional
transactions is processed on the books of banks, brokers, and other
securities
intermediaries,
or
directly
between
securities
intermediaries, without going through Fedwire or DTC.
International securities settlement systems, mainly Euroclear and
Clearstream, also process foreign and international securities
transactions for U.S. and non-U.S. investors. Euroclear, the largest
settlement system for internationally traded securities, reported a
processing volume of €560 trillion in 2008, including transactions
for U.S. investors.208 In light of the systemic importance of payment,
clearing, and settlement systems, it is not surprising that the
Administration has proposed that the Federal Reserve should have
additional authority over these institutions as part of its overhaul of
the regulation of systemically important financial companies.
The Administration’s proposed legislation would principally give
the Federal Reserve authority to set risk management standards for
both systemically important financial market utilities and the conduct
of systemically important payment, clearing, and settlement activities
by any financial institution.209 Most financial institutions conduct
some form of payment, clearing, or settlement function for their
customers, including street name settlement, wire transfers, clearing
bank operations, and tri-party repurchase facilities. In addition, some
of these institutions conduct these activities on a “multilateral” basis.
Any bank, broker, insurance company, or other financial institution
that is not otherwise systemically important could have its payment,
clearing, and settlement business subject to the Federal Reserve risk
management oversight if the business is found to be systemically
206. Federal Reserve, Fedwire Securities Service—Annual Data, http://www.federal
reserve.gov/paymentsystems/fedsecs_ann.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2010).
207. The Depository Trust Company Web site, http://www.dtcc.com/about/subs/
dtc.php (last visited Jan. 14, 2010).
208. Press Release, Euroclear, Nordic CSD to Join the Euroclear Group—CSD
Consolidation Accelerates (June 2, 2008), http://www.euroclear.eu/3027_ENG_ST.htm.
209. Davis Polk, Obama Administration Proposes Sweeping Legislation to Regulate Overthe-Counter Derivatives (Aug. 17, 2009), http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/
5a453323-3f01-4885-aede-07938800eedd/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/f08f8b6e-3
5a8-4ad8-88e4-8b9c697e5672/08.17.09.Obama.Derivatives.html.
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important. This would provide the “strong and consistent prudential
standards and supervisory oversight” that Chairman Bernanke has
recently reiterated are needed.210
Moreover, the proposed legislation authorizes the Federal
Reserve to open and maintain an account for a designated financial
market utility and offer the designated financial market utility the
same financial services, discount window, and borrowing privileges as
the Federal Reserve may provide to a depository institution under
the Federal Reserve Act. This means that designated financial market
utilities would have access to central bank money, making it feasible
for them to settle delivery-versus-payment transactions in U.S.
dollars on their own books without going through intermediary
banks. They would also be able to tap the Federal Reserve as a lender
of last resort, should they have liquidity issues.
(3) Securitization markets. The regulation of the U.S.
securitization markets is another alleged weakness that contributed
to the financial crisis. In a typical securitization, loan originators
extend credit to borrowers and sell the income stream from that loan
to a securitizer, who packages it along with many similar loans in a
special purpose vehicle. Slices of the special purpose vehicle’s income
stream are sold to investors as asset-backed securities. Securitization
technology is meant to spread risk; instead of trapping capital at the
lender level by requiring a lender to hold all of the credit risk of a
loan until its maturity, securitization allows a lender to sell the loan
immediately and use the funds received to originate new loans.
Securitization has led to an enormous increase in the availability of
credit financing for businesses and individuals over the past two
decades and, as such, has been a major engine of economic growth.
However, a loan originator’s ability to avoid the credit risk of
individual borrowers through securitization can also reduce the
originator’s incentive to make sure borrowers are likely to be able to
repay. In the extreme, if a lender retains no risk and is compensated
for making loans regardless of repayment by the borrower, there may
be a weakened incentive for the lender to determine the
creditworthiness of the borrower. Allegations that some originators
in the subprime mortgage market engaged in poor underwriting
(through so-called “no-doc” loans, for example) led the
210. Ben S. Bernanke, Fed. Reserve Chairman, Remarks on Regulatory Reform Before
the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 1, 2009),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20091001a.htm.
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Administration to propose requiring originators and securitizers of
loans to retain some of the risk in the loans they sell as part of the
securitization chain.
The Administration proposes to take a two-pronged approach to
the reform of the securitization markets. First, the Administration’s
proposed legislation aims to strengthen underwriting standards by
requiring originators and securitizers to retain some of the risk of the
loans they extend or package as part of an asset-backed securities
securitization chain. These “skin-in-the-game” provisions would
reduce the incentives for originators and securitizers to fund loans
regardless of the borrower’s ability to pay, as is alleged to have
occurred frequently in the subprime mortgage market. The proposed
legislation instructs the SEC and the federal banking agencies (the
Federal Reserve, the National Bank Supervisor, and the FDIC) to
enact regulations requiring securitizers to keep 5% of the risk of loans
packaged in securitization transactions. Second, the proposed
legislation aims to make the asset-backed securities investment
process itself more transparent through a combination of disclosure
by asset-backed securities issuers and improved information
dissemination by credit rating agencies.
c. Consumer financial protection agency. A number of regulators
and politicians have taken up the call for consumer protection,
arguing that unfair and deceptive practices contributed to instability
in the financial markets and the downturn in the economy by luring
consumers into mortgages and products that were not appropriate
for their circumstances.
The Administration has proposed creating a Consumer Financial
Protection Agency, whose mission would be “to promote
transparency, simplicity, fairness, accountability, and access in the
market for consumer financial products or services.”211 However, the
agency would be vested with vast new powers delineated in such a
way that future jurisdictional turf wars are inevitable.212
The proposed legislation would authorize the agency to regulate
“consumer financial products or services,” defined as “any financial
product or service to be used by a consumer primarily for personal,
211. Davis Polk, Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, July 1, 2009,
http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/2c9ef9b3-6871-4eac-9498-49d5fde025c7/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/32be2bc8-4cd3-4673-b1b8-0308ab5100b3/070109_
CFPAA.html (citation omitted).
212. Id.
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family or household purposes.”213 The legislation would provide the
new agency with broad authority to issue rules to ensure consumer
protection. This authority would include prescribing rules regarding
disclosures, sales practices, minimum operational standards, and
requirements to offer standard products and services. For example,
the new agency would be authorized to prohibit pre-dispute
arbitration, propose model mortgage loan disclosure language, and
require disclosure allowing consumers to compare financial products
or services.
The proposed legislation would grant the agency broad authority
to collect information, conduct investigations, and bring
enforcement proceedings. The agency would also be empowered to
require written reports from regulated entities to ensure compliance
with consumer protection laws and rules adopted pursuant to the
proposed legislation. The agency would also be authorized to issue
subpoenas for the production of documents and testimony and to
issue civil investigative demands for the production of documents,
written reports or answers to questions, and oral testimony.
Throughout the proposed legislation, the role of state law
enforcement with respect to consumer financial products is featured
as a recurring theme. The proposed legislation contemplates that
federal standards would act as a floor, not a ceiling, and explicitly
encourages states to enact stricter laws. The legislation provides that
any state consumer law of general application would apply to
national banks and that state attorneys general would be authorized
to bring actions in federal courts to enforce federal laws. This could
lead to a fifty-state regulatory regime which would complicate, not
streamline, consumer financial regulation.
d. Executive compensation and corporate governance. Among the
topics that have received widespread attention in the United States
and abroad is executive compensation and corporate governance
reform. Outrage over the size of executive pay and concern about
the short-term risk-taking incentives created by pay structures have
propelled these issues to the forefront of the public debate. The
Administration has proposed draft legislation to address executive
compensation and corporate governance issues.
The proposed new legislation would require all U.S. public
companies to grant shareholders an annual non-binding vote on

213. Id.
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executive compensation packages (say-on-pay) and further regulate
compensation committees.214
If enacted, shareholders will be asked to cast non-binding votes
to approve executive compensation as disclosed in proxy statements.
Shareholders will also be asked to separately approve golden
parachute payments in the context of meetings involving an
acquisition, merger, or sale of assets. This vote would also be nonbinding.
According to the Administration, the purpose of the legislation is
to encourage accountability and better disclosure. The U.S. Treasury
pointed to the experience in the United Kingdom where say-on-pay
was adopted in 2002, noting that the rules have promoted increased
shareholder dialogue and improved compensation practices,
including the hiring of independent consultants, detailed
compensation guidelines, and an increase in the number of meetings
of compensation panels.
Under the proposal, compensation committee members would
be subject to the same additional independence standards as audit
committee members, and compensation consultants, legal counsel,
and other advisors to the compensation committee would have to
meet independence standards promulgated by the SEC.
Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee Barney
Frank has also distributed a draft of executive compensation and
corporate governance legislation that is similar to the
Administration’s proposals on say-on-pay and compensation
committee matters. It would require financial institutions to disclose
the structure of incentive-based compensation arrangements
applicable to all employees to their federal regulator. Financial
institutions would include banks, bank holding companies, brokerdealers, credit unions, and investment advisers and any other
institution identified by federal financial regulators. Such disclosure
would need to be sufficient for federal regulators to determine
whether the compensation structure is aligned with sound risk
management, structured to account for the time horizon of risks,
and meets any other criteria that the regulators may determine to be
appropriate.
214. Davis Polk, Treasury Seeks Legislation to Enact Say on Pay and Compensation
Committees Changes for All U.S. Public Companies, July 20, 2009, http://www.davispolk.
com/files/Publication/dccc1c9e-91c7-40db-b2ed-05ba2330b43b/Presentation/Publication
Attachment/35d6b2c5-4403-4c9c-a342-0a19c04549c6/072009_SayonPay.html.
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The House proposal would also grant federal regulators the
authority to proscribe inappropriate or imprudent compensation
practices for financial institutions as part of their solvency regulation.
Federal regulators would be required to enact regulations that
prohibit any incentive payment arrangement or other feature that
encourages inappropriate risks by financial institutions, that threaten
the safety and soundness of financial institutions, or that could have
a serious adverse effect on economic conditions or financial stability.
Recently, the Federal Reserve has indicated that it will introduce
guidelines to curb pay packages in banking. The Federal Reserve’s
guidance to banks “will apply not only to the top five or ten
executives but way down into the organization—to traders or
anybody whose activities can affect the risk profile of the company,”
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke told Congress, presenting
it as a “safety-and-soundness” issue.215 Moreover, there have also
been several executive compensation and corporate governance
proposals coming out of the United Kingdom, the European Union,
the G-20, and the Financial Stability Board. For a summary of these
proposals, please see Annex D.
B. U.K. Proposals
The financial storm has prompted the United Kingdom to
rethink its institutional framework for financial regulation. On July 8,
2009, HM Treasury released a White Paper—Reforming Financial
Markets—outlining its regulatory reform proposals.216 Under the
proposals, the current institutional arrangements among the
tripartite authorities—the Treasury, the Bank of England, and the
FSA—would largely be left in place. About two weeks later, the
opposition Conservative Party, now leading in polls for the next
general election to be held by June 2010, released its
counterproposals in an alternative White Paper—From Crisis to
Confidence: Plan for Sound Banking.217 Under its proposals, the
Conservative Party proposed a paradigm shift in the regulatory
215. See Paul Wiseman & Pallavi Gogoi, Fed Aims to Rein in Bank Pay Abuses Way Below
Top Execs, USA TODAY, Oct. 6, 2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/
industries/banking/2009-10-06-fed-rules-bank-pay_N.htm?csp=34.
216. See HM TREASURY, supra note 142.
217. See U.K. CONSERVATIVE PARTY, FROM CRISIS TO CONFIDENCE: PLAN FOR SOUND
BANKING (July 2009), available at http://www.conservatives.com/News/News_stories/
2009/07/~/media/Files/Downloadable%20Files/PlanforSoundBanking.ashx.
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framework. If it wins the election, the Conservative Party intends to
abolish the “integrated” approach to financial regulation, widely
known as the “FSA model” that was put in place some twelve years
ago by the U.K. government under the Labour Party, and move to a
“twin peaks” structure.
1. U.K. Labour government’s plan
HM Treasury argues in its White Paper that the current
institutional framework remains the right approach.218 As widely
expected, HM Treasury’s White Paper endorsed all of the major
findings and recommendations in the Turner Review: A Regulatory
Response to the Global Banking Crisis, an internationally acclaimed
study led by FSA Chairman Lord Adair Turner.219 To better
coordinate among the tripartite authorities, it proposes to establish a
Council for Financial Stability (CFS), a largely advisory body. To
strengthen the macro-prudential oversight, both the FSA and the
Bank of England would be statutorily responsible for financial
stability.
a. The Turner Review. Since the publication of the Turner
Review in March 2009, many of its recommendations have been
endorsed by the G-20 summits, or recognized or adopted in the
United States and the European Union. These recommendations,
which are dealt with at length in relevant U.S., EU, or G-20
regulatory reform proposals in this Article and thus will not be
repeated here, cover capital and liquidity requirements, macroprudential oversight, regulation of systemically important
institutions, crediting rating agencies, remuneration, risk
management and corporate governance, market infrastructure for

218. Shortly after the publication of HM Treasury’s White Paper, the U.K. House of
Commons’ Treasury Committee released a report that dismissed its proposed reforms to the
institutional structure of the tripartite authorities as “largely cosmetic.” The Parliamentary
Committee’s report stated that the lines of authorities remain a muddle: there is still a lack of
clarity regarding who is responsible for systemic oversight and who has executive authority in
times of crisis. The report pointed out that before the crisis hit, no one had formal
responsibility for financial stability, but now many do, including the Bank of England, the
Financial Stability Committee within the Bank, the FSA, and the proposed Council for
Financial Stability. See HOUSE OF COMMONS TREASURY COMMITTEE, BANKING CRISIS:
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 3–4 (July 31, 2009), available at http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmtreasy/767/767.pdf.
219. See generally HM TREASURY, supra note 142; FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY,
supra note 37.
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OTC derivatives, etc.220 What is worthy of more treatment here with
regard to the situation in the United Kingdom is Lord Turner’s call
for a more “intrusive” regulatory and supervisory approach by the
FSA, a shift from its much discredited “light-touch” regulatory
philosophy.221 In particular, the Turner Review recommends that the
FSA should not just ensure systems and processes of the supervised
institutions, but also challenge their business models and strategies.
“This shift will imply a greater willingness . . . to intervene directly if
[the FSA] perceive[s] that specific business strategies are creating
undue risk to the bank itself or to the wider system.”222 It also
recommends more intensive information requirements on certain key
risks (e.g., liquidity), a focus on remuneration policies, and more
regulatory scrutiny of technical skills of certain key management
personnel.223 Despite its future being clouded in uncertainty, the
FSA under the current leadership of Lord Turner has already
substantially intensified its regulation of the City.
b. Revised “integrated” model. The FSA would continue to be the
single regulator of all the financial services firms in the United
Kingdom, responsible for both prudential regulation and consumer
and investor protection. To strengthen coordination and
cooperation among the tripartite authorities, HM Treasury proposes
to establish a Council for Financial Stability (CFS).224 The FSA
would be granted a new statutory remit for financial stability,
importantly, with rule-making powers in furtherance of its new
objective.
(1) Council for Financial Stability (CFS).225 The CFS would
be created on a statutory basis to replace the current Standing
Committee under a Memorandum of Understanding. The CFS
would consist of the same tripartite authorities, chaired by the
Chancellor of the Exchequer. Similar to the Financial Services
Oversight Council proposed by the Obama Administration, the CFS
will mainly be an advisory body and a forum for discussion and
coordination of regulatory actions among the tripartite authorities.
The CFS will hold regular meetings throughout the year and, if
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

See generally FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, supra note 37.
See id. at 86–92.
See id. at 88.
Id. at 53, 76.
See HM TREASURY, supra note 142, at 12.
See id. at 12, 48–50.
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necessary, hold emergency meetings to analyze and examine
emerging systemic risks to the United Kingdom’s economy.
(2) The FSA.226 As the single prudential regulator of all
financial services firms in the United Kingdom, the FSA has legal
authority to set prudential standards, such as capital, liquidity, and
risk management standards. HM Treasury proposes to legislate to
provide the FSA with an explicit financial stability objective and
extend its rule-making power, “to give it clearer legal authority to set
rules whose purpose is to protect wider financial stability.”227 Under
the proposals, the FSA would be granted more regulatory powers,
including expanded powers to gather information from unregulated
institutions to determine whether they should be brought under
formal FSA supervision, enhanced enforcement powers to police
market misconduct, and extended powers to intervene in individual
institutions in pursuit of its new financial stability objective, etc.
(3) The Bank of England.228 The Banking Act 2009 (Banking
Act), which became effective on February 21, 2009, has already
provided the Bank of England “a clear statutory objective” for
financial stability.229 HM Treasury acknowledges the responsibilities
of the Bank of England to protect financial stability under existing
legal authority, e.g., its role as lender of last resort and its oversight
over key inter-bank payment systems. In particular, the Banking Act,
which established a special resolution regime (SRR) for banks,
granted the Bank of England the power to intervene to resolve
failing banks once the FSA “triggers” an institution into the SRR.230
2. Conservative Party’s plan: A “twin-peaks” structure
Despite the differences with HM Treasury and the ruling Labour
Party, the Conservative Party’s plan does not dispute most of the
recommendations from the Turner Review.231 Instead, the
Conservative Party proposes a drastic shift in the institutional
framework for regulation.

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
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See id. at 10–12, 51–57.
Id. at 11.
See id. at 8–9, 50–51.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
See generally U.K. CONSERVATIVE PARTY, supra note 217.
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Under the Conservative Party’s plan, the FSA and the tripartite
system, instituted by the U.K. government while controlled by the
Labour Party some twelve years ago, would be abolished. The FSA’s
bank supervisory powers, which were transferred to it from the Bank
of England, would be transferred back. The remnants of the FSA
would be merged with the Office of Fair Trading that is in charge of
the regulation of consumer credit, and the newly merged entity
would be reconstituted to become “a powerful new Consumer
Protection Agency” that would be “a far more consumer-oriented,
transparent and focused body than the FSA.”232 While many bank
regulators in the United States are questioning, and the industry
representatives are lobbying hard against, the Obama
Administration’s proposal to create a Consumer Financial Protection
Agency, and the idea of separating consumer protection from
prudential supervision, the U.K. Conservatives confirm in their
proposals that they would demolish the FSA, and the “integrated”
model along with it, if they win the election next year.
“In the United States, they’ve called on the Federal Reserve,”
said David Cameron, the Conservative Party’s leader, “In Britain, it’s
time to call on the Bank of England.”233 Under the Conservative
Party’s plan, the Bank of England would be “strong and powerful,”
responsible for both macro-prudential regulation to ensure financial
stability and micro-prudential regulation with oversight over all
banks and other financial institutions, including insurance
companies.234 Under the plan, a Financial Policy Committee would
be created within the Bank, working alongside, and in “close
coordination” with, the Monetary Policy Committee to monitor
systemic risks and execute the special resolution regime for failing
banks.235 Similar to the collective responsibility model of the
Monetary Policy Committee, the Financial Policy Committee will
have independent members with representation of external experts.
A primary goal of this new structure is to “ensure that monetary
policy, financial stability and the regulation of individual institutions
are closely coordinated.”236 In an interesting contrast to the
232. See id. at 7, 42–48.
233. See Julia Werdigier, Britain’s Conservative Party Proposes Regulatory Shift, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 2009, at B3.
234. See U.K. CONSERVATIVE PARTY, supra note 217, at 4–5, 19–28.
235. See id. at 4–5, 25–26.
236. Id. at 5.
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sentiment in the U.S. Congress, George Osborne, the U.K. shadow
Chancellor, said of their proposals that the financial crisis had shown
the need to “bring together the operation of monetary policy with
regulation of the banking system . . . . We have learned you can’t
separate central banking from the banking system.”237
Critics warn that a change of this magnitude would cause massive
disruption, demoralizing the FSA’s staff and making its task very
difficult over the coming year.238 Some commented that a danger of
“vacuum” would be created at the heart of U.K. regulatory policy at
a time when authorities are still grappling with a financial crisis.239
C. Other European Proposals
1. Overview
Regulatory reforms at the EU level represented another step
towards more centralized authority in the European financial
regulatory system. On September 23, 2009, the European
Commission proposed draft legislation to strengthen the financial
regulation in Europe that largely adopted the principles of the de
Larosière Report as endorsed by the European Council of Ministers
on June 19, 2009.240 The proposed legislation would create two panEuropean agencies to improve regulation of the financial system—
the European Systemic Risk Board and the European System of
Financial Supervisors. The European System of Financial Supervisors
would consist of three European Supervisory Authorities—a
European Banking Authority, a European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Authority, and a European Securities and
Markets Authority. The European Supervisory Authorities would
assume full supervisory powers for those entities that have pan237. George Osborne, Foreword to U.K. CONSERVATIVE PARTY, supra note 217, at 2.
238. See George Parker & Megan Murphy, Tory Plan Recipe for Turf Wars, Say Critics,
FIN. TIMES, July 21, 2009, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3075bd62-756c11de-9ed5-00144feabdc0.html.
239. See Laurence Norman & Natasha Brereton, International Finance: U.K. Regulator
Defends Its Role, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2009, at C2, available at http://online.wsj.com
/article/SB124809502891 665055.html.
240. See European Commission, Financial Supervision: New Legislative Proposals
(Sept. 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/committees/
index_en.htm#package; Press Release, European Commission, Commission Adopts Legislative
Proposals to Strengthen Financial Regulation in Europe, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1347&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&gu
iLanguage=en.
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European reach, such as credit rating agencies and EU central
counterparty clearing houses.
Apart from the proposals to create pan-European regulatory
authorities, the European Commission’s latest reform efforts have
been directed in several areas: hedge fund regulation, the regulation
of credit rating agencies, and OTC derivatives. The proposed
legislation for hedge fund regulation has been very controversial and
has met particularly strong opposition from the United Kingdom,
home to the majority of hedge funds in Europe. Because of the
proposed legislation’s extraterritorial impact, the U.S. government
has also weighed in on the debate.241 In comparison, the newly
adopted regulations on credit rating agencies and the
Communication on OTC derivatives regulation are largely aligned
with the regulatory developments in the United States.242 The
discussion below will focus on the proposed pan-European
regulatory entities and the proposed legislation on hedge fund
regulation.
2. The proposed pan-European regulatory entities
The proposed European Systemic Risk Board would monitor and
assess threats to financial stability. Its role would be largely advisory,
and it would have no independent regulatory authority. The
European Systemic Risk Board would be able to issue non-binding
risk warnings and recommendations, but with no legally binding
powers. The European Systemic Risk Board would be composed of
the heads of the European Central Bank and the member state
central banks, as well as the three chairs of the European System of
241. See Alistair MacDonald, U.S. Enters Europe’s Fund Debate, WALL ST. J., July 27,
2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124864567973282125.html.
242. See REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL ON CREDIT
RATING AGENCIES, available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st03/
st03642.en09.pdf. On July 3, 2009, the European Commission published a Communication
on OTC derivatives regulation. Echoing the regulatory developments in the United States, the
Communication proposes the following measures: (i) increasing use of central counterparties;
(ii) promoting standardization of OTC derivatives; (iii) encouraging cleared derivatives to be
traded on organized markets; and (iv) proposing the use of central data repositories for noncleared derivatives. See COM (2009) 332, European Commission, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/docs/derivatives/report_en.pdf; EC
Proposals for Increased Transparency and Risk Mitigation in Derivatives Markets, Cleary
Gottlieb Alert Memo (July 24, 2009), available at http://www.cgsh.com/
files/News/e5091569-0e2f-4262-9af9-411a2d99a6be/Presentation/NewsAttachment/761
5f030-ff35-4d3d-87a2-b7839595c7c0/CGSH%20Alert%20-%20OTC%20Derivatives.pdf.
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Financial Supervisors. The head of European Systemic Risk Board
would be elected by the European central banks.
The European Supervisory Authorities would be built up from,
and replace, the existing Committees of Supervisors, known as the
Level 3 Committees, and be responsible for improving the quality
and uniformity of national supervision, establishing supervisory
colleges to strengthen oversight of cross-border institutions, and
creating a single regulatory rulebook for the European Union.
National supervisors would retain responsibility for day-to-day
supervision, but, in a large concession by advocates of member
nations’ autonomy, especially the United Kingdom, the European
Supervisory Authorities would have binding authority to determine
whether a national supervisor is complying with the EU rulebook
and other EU law and issue binding decisions in the case of a
disagreement.
Many hope that the three European Supervisory Authorities will
eventually lead to European level financial supervision and
enforcement which has, until now, been politically unpalatable. The
focus on binding decisions reflects the experience that, even with
identical legal texts, harmonized standards, or permitted variants
from “floors,” the EU experience with multiple interpreters and
enforcers of the law has not resulted in effective regulation.
However, the relationship between the proposed European
Supervisory Authorities and national authorities remains unclear,
perhaps deliberately so. As a result of pressure from the United
Kingdom, EU leaders have expressly declared that “the decisions
taken by the European Supervisory Authorities should not impinge
in any way on the fiscal responsibilities of Member States,” and a
European Supervisory Authority is not allowed to require a member
state to spend its taxpayers’ money.243
3. Hedge fund regulation
On April 30, 2009, the European Commission issued a proposed
Directive on Investment Alternative Fund Managers (“Directive”).244

243. Nouriel Roubini & Elisa Parisi-Capone, Regulatory Reform: A Primer, FORBES,
June 25, 2009, available at http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/24/regulatory-reformobama-eu-switzerland-hedge-funds-opinions-columnists-roubini.html.
244. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE
OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 207 (2009), available at
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The Directive went much further than the proposed U.S. hedge
fund regulation, most controversially by imposing leverage limits and
extraterritorial standards. Since the majority of Europeans’ hedge
funds are currently managed by U.K. managers, the ongoing fight is
mostly between Continental Europe, led by France and Germany on
one side, and the United Kingdom on the other.245 The proposed
Directive is, however, not expected to be adopted until at least late
2010, owing to the complex legislative process in the European
Union.
The United States also has a large stake in this debate, since the
extraterritorial standards imposed by the Directive could block U.S.
business in Europe. The Directive would (i) prohibit the marketing
of any funds domiciled outside the European Union unless a fund’s
home country has certain tax agreements with the EU manager’s
home country and (ii) impose an equivalency test between the
provisions of the Directive and the legislation of a relevant non-EU
country if a non-EU-based manager is to market any funds in the
European Union.
D. G-20 Proposals
Financial markets are global in nature. Unless common
regulatory standards are applied and enforced across national
borders, opportunities for regulatory arbitrage will arise. The current
financial crisis adds urgency to the need to seek a global approach to
financial regulatory reform. Since the financial crisis intensified in the
fall of 2008, three G-20 summits have been held to address the
crisis, and financial regulatory reform was top on the agenda. The
leaders at the G-20 summit in Pittsburgh affirmed that going
forward, the G-20 will be the premier forum for international
economic cooperation.246

http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/investment/docs/alternative_investments/fund_manag
ers_proposal_en.pdf.
245. Alistair MacDonald, U.S. Enters Europe’s Fund Debate, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2009,
at C3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124864567973282125.html.
246. G-20, LEADERS’ STATEMENT: THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, 3 (2009), available at
http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf
[hereinafter G-20, PITTSBURGH SUMMIT].

491

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

4/26/2010 8:05 PM

2010

Broad consensus was reached in the G-20 summits on how to
reform the global financial system.247 To strengthen international
coordination and cooperation, leaders at the G-20 summits agreed
to reform the international financial institutions. In particular, the
reconstituted Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) will be jointly responsible for global financial
stability.248 The FSB will be responsible for coordinating and
monitoring progress in strengthening international financial
regulation.249 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel
Committee) will continue to be the leading forum for the
development of international standards for prudential regulation.250
The discussion below focuses on the FSB and IMF, the newly
proposed Basel capital regulatory framework, and cross-border bank
resolutions.
1. The FSB and IMF
The G-20 summits agreed that the institutional capacity of the
FSB and IMF should be substantially strengthened. Tasked to
promote and coordinate the development of international best
practices and regulatory standards, the reconstituted FSB with
enhanced capacity would have equal institutional standing alongside
the Bretton Woods institutions—the IMF and World Bank.251 The
resources of the IMF will be significantly increased to strengthen its
role as lender of last resort in the international financial system.

247. See G-20, DECLARATION ON STRENGTHENING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2009),
available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/Fin_Deps_Fin_Reg_Annex_020409__1615_
final.pdf [hereinafter G-20, LONDON DECLARATION]. See generally FIN. STABILITY BD.,
IMPROVING FINANCIAL REGULATION, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD TO G20 LEADERS (2009), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/
r_090925b.pdf [hereinafter FSB, IMPROVING]; FIN. STABILITY BD., OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS
IN IMPLEMENTING THE LONDON SUMMIT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING
FINANCIAL STABILITY, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD TO G-20 LEADERS
(2009), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_090925a.pdf
[hereinafter FSB, OVERVIEW].
248. See G-20, LONDON DECLARATION, supra note 247.
249. See G-20, PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, supra note 246; G-20, LONDON DECLARATION,
supra note 247.
250. See G-20, PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, supra note 246.
251. See G-20, THE GLOBAL PLAN FOR RECOVERY AND REFORM (2009), available at
http://www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf [hereinafter G-20, LONDON
COMMUNIQUE].
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Since the G-20 summit in London, the FSB has expanded its
membership, now including all G-20 countries, and held its
inaugural meeting in June 2009.252 The new institutional structures
of the FSB now include a Steering Committee and three Standing
Committees. In particular, the Standing Committee for Supervisory
and Regulatory Cooperation, now chaired by Lord Turner, will
address coordination issues that arise among supervisors and
regulators and will monitor and advise on best practice in meeting
regulatory standards with a view to ensure consistency, cooperation,
and a level-playing field across jurisdictions.
The IMF has tripled its lendable resources to $750 billion
through various means,253 including bilateral pledges and, for the
first time, issuance of its own notes.254 The IMF also approved an
allocation of $283 billion Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) to boost
world liquidity.255 To ensure the IMF’s long-term relevance and
legitimacy, leaders at the G-20 summits emphasized that the IMF’s
governance structure should be reformed and modernized to reflect
changes in the world economy and give greater voice and
representation to developing countries.256
To promote financial stability at the global level, the G-20
summits committed to the following257: the IMF and FSB, in
collaboration, to conduct Early Warning Exercises and identify the
build-up of macro-economical and financial risks and recommend
actions needed to address them; the IMF and FSB to produce
guidelines for national authorities to assess whether a financial
institution, market or an instrument is systemically important; the
IMF and FSB, in collaboration with the World Bank and Basel
Committee, to develop an international framework for cross-border
bank resolution mechanism; the FSB, in collaboration with Bank for
International Settlement (BIS) and other international standard
252. Press Release, Fin. Stability Bd., Fin. Stability Bd. Holds Inaugural Meeting in Basel
(June 27, 2009), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/pr_090627.pdf.
253. IMF, BOLSTERING THE IMF’S LENDING CAPACITY (2009), available at http://
www.imf.org/external/np/exr/faq/contribution.htm.
254. Press Release, IMF, IMF Signs US$50 Billion Note Purchase Agreement with China
(Sept. 2, 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr09293.htm.
255. IMF, LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES TO BENEFIT FROM IMF ALLOCATION OF SDRS
(2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/cs/news/2009/CSO83.htm.
256. G-20, PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, supra note 246, at 10–11; see G-20, LONDON
COMMUNIQUE, supra note 251.
257. See G-20, LONDON DECLARATION, supra note 247.

493

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

4/26/2010 8:05 PM

2010

setters, to develop macro-prudential regulatory tools; and the FSB to
set guidelines for, and support the establishment, functioning of, and
participation in, supervisory colleges, including through ongoing
identification of the most systemically important cross-border firms.
2. Basel Committee and capital requirements
The G-20 agreed that the Basel Committee, in collaboration
with other international bodies and national authorities, should
strengthen the Basel II Capital Framework for prudential regulation.
Since the G-20 summit in London, the Basel Committee, the United
States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union have all
moved forward with various proposals on the capital, liquidity, and
leverage requirements.258 Although all of these proposals converge
on the basic principles, specific quantitative proposals are still being
worked out. The G-20 summit in Pittsburgh called for reaching an
international agreement on the new capital framework by December
31, 2010, with the aim of implementation by December 31, 2012.259
a. Capital. The minimum capital requirement and the capital
buffer above it would be higher than the pre-crisis levels. In
particular, common equity, especially voting common equity as
proposed by the U.S. Treasury, would be required to constitute a
large majority of Tier 1 capital. Systemically important firms would
be subject to even tougher capital requirements, such as a capital
surcharge as proposed by the Basel Committee.
The new capital framework would impose higher risk-based
capital charges to various exposures, such as off-balance sheet
vehicles, trading book activities and credit securitizations, particularly
re-securitizations such as CDOs.260 The U.S. proposal would also
258. See generally U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, PRINCIPLES FOR REFORMING THE U.S. AND
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CAPITAL FRAMEWORK FOR BANKING FIRMS (2009), available
at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/capital-statement_090309.pdf; Press Release,
Bank for Int’l. Settlements, Comprehensive Response to the Global Banking Crisis (Sept. 7,
2009),
available
at
http://www.bis.org/press/p090907.htm
[hereinafter
BIS,
Comprehensive Response]; G-20, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE ACTIONS OF THE LONDON AND
WASHINGTON G-20 SUMMITS (2009), available at http://www.G20.org/Documents/
20090905_G20_progress_update_London_Fin_Mins_final.pdf. For more information, please
see Annex C.
259. G-20, PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, supra note 246.
260. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, REVISIONS TO THE BASEL II MARKET
RISK FRAMEWORK (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs158.htm; BANK FOR
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, GUIDELINES FOR COMPUTING CAPITAL FOR INCREMENTAL
RISK IN THE TRADING BOOK (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs158.pdf;

494

DO NOT DELETE

421

4/26/2010 8:05 PM

The Global Financial Crisis

cover equity investments and counterparty credit risk exposures to
financial firms (e.g., non-centrally cleared derivatives, repos, reverse
repos, securities lending and borrowing transactions, margin loans,
etc.).
To mitigate the pro-cyclicality effects of the current capital
framework, a so-called counter-cyclical capital buffer framework
would be developed to reflect more forward-looking, through-thecycle considerations, resulting in higher capital requirements in the
early phases of the credit cycle, and more uniform capital
requirements throughout the cycle. The counter-cyclical capital
buffer framework as proposed by the Basel Committee would also
include capital conservation measures to constrain capital
distributions, e.g., dividend payments, share buybacks, and
compensation.261 Separately, a framework of more forward-looking
loan loss reserves is being developed by international and national
regulatory bodies in collaboration with the accounting standard
setters. In August 2008, the European Commission published a
consultative paper on through-the-cycle expected loss provisioning
based on the Spanish dynamic provisioning model.262
b. Liquidity.263 The Basel Committee, the United States, the
United Kingdom, and the European Union have all actively moved
ahead to institute quantitative and qualitative frameworks for better
liquidity risk management. The focus has been on several elements,
including: (i) adequate levels of highly liquid marketable securities
free of impediments that can be used to meet liquidity needs in
stressful situations; (ii) increased focus on firms’ stress testing and
contingency funding plans that sufficiently address potential adverse
liquidity events and emergency cash flow requirements; and (iii)
comprehensive internal liquidity measurement and monitoring
systems. In particular, the Basel Committee will introduce a

BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, ENHANCEMENTS TO THE BASEL II FRAMEWORK
(2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs157.pdf; Accompanying Document to a
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Capital
Requirements Directive on Trading Book, Securitization Issues and Remuneration Policies,
COM (2009) 362 final (July 13, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/summary_en.pdf.
261. BIS, Comprehensive Response, supra note 258.
262. European Commission, Commission Services Staff Working Document: Possible
Further Changes to the Capital Requirements Directive (2009), available at http://
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2009/capital_requirements_directive/
CRD_consultation_document_en.pdf.
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minimum global standard for funding liquidity that includes a
liquidity coverage ratio requirement, underpinned by a longer-term
structural liquidity ratio to address liquidity mismatches.264
c. Leverage. The new capital framework would impose a non-riskbased leverage ratio. The Basel Committee is expected to release a
proposal by the end of 2009 with calibration and impact assessment
to be completed by mid-2010.265 To ensure comparability, the G-20
at their summit in Pittsburgh agreed that the details of the leverage
ratio will be harmonized internationally to adjust for accounting
differences.266
3. Cross-border bank resolution
There is a growing consensus that the international financial
system needs a better mechanism for resolving systemically important
financial institutions. Many believe that the failure of Lehman
Brothers exposed a process that does not meet appropriate standards
for the orderly winding up of systemically important financial
institutions. The G-20 concluded that the world needs to develop
internationally-coordinated tools and frameworks for the effective
resolution of large, financial groups to help mitigate the disruption
of their failures to the financial system and reduce moral hazard in
the future. Leaders at the G-20 summit in Pittsburgh specifically
committed to address issues on cross-border resolution and crisis
management by the end of 2010.267

263. For more information on the U.S. proposed interagency guideline on liquidity
management, see Proposed Interagency Guidance—Funding and Liquidity Risk Management,
74 Fed. Reg. 32,035 (July 6, 2009), available at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/
2009/pdf/E9-15800.pdf. For more information on the FSA liquidity managements, see FSA,
CP08/22: STRENGTHENING LIQUIDITY STANDARDS (2009), available at http://www.fsa.
gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp08_22.pdf; FSA, CP09/14: STRENGTHENING LIQUIDITY STANDARDS 3:
LIQUIDITY TRANSITIONAL MEASURES (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/
pubs/cp/cp09_14.pdf; and FSA, CP09/13: STRENGTHENING LIQUIDITY STANDARDS 2:
LIQUIDITY REPORTING (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp09_13.pdf.
For more information on the EU proposal for liquidity management, see COMMITTEE OF
EUROPEAN BANKING SUPERVISORS, CONSULTATION PAPER ON LIQUIDITY BUFFERS &
SURVIVAL PERIODS (2009), available at http://www.c-ebs.org/getdoc/8ed674fc-d7674eed-b0c2-ac6f65b92d04/CP28-on-Liquidity-Buffers.aspx.
264. FSB, IMPROVING, supra note 247, at 5; BIS, Comprehensive Response, supra note
258.
265. See BIS, Comprehensive Response, supra note 258.
266. G-20, PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, supra note 246, at 8.
267. Id. at 9.
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a. Contingency planning.268 The G-20 at their summit in
Pittsburgh emphasized the development of internationally-consistent
firm-specific contingency and resolution plans, or “living wills.”269
All major cross-border firms with an FSB supervisory college would
be required to develop such plans, considering both “goingconcern,” or “gone concern” scenarios. The plans to be prepared by
the firms would cover how to exit risky positions and scale back
activities in an orderly fashion, and an effective, rapid, and costeffective wind-down, if necessary. The FSB, under its Cross-Border
Crisis Management Working Group, has already scheduled such
contingency planning discussions with the major firms, that will take
place later this year and in the first half of 2010.
b. Cross-border bank resolution and national bank insolvency
regimes. The G-20 summit at Pittsburgh specifically endorsed two
major international initiatives to develop cross-border bank
resolution frameworks.270 One initiative is the Cross-Border Bank
Resolution Group at the Basel Committee (CBRG). The CBRG
recently issued a consultative paper that proposes actions to improve
efficiency and effectiveness of cross-border crisis management and
bank resolutions.271 The other initiative is the IMF/World Bank
Global Bank Insolvency Initiative. The IMF and World Bank issued
an interim report in April 2009 and will issue a final report in the
spring of 2010.272
With more European countries moving to institute special bank
resolution regimes, it makes more sense to harmonize differences,
and ensure consistency, among the regimes across countries. The
European Commission plans to release a consultative paper that
examines the issue of harmonizing rules of its member states for
unwinding troubled banks and will probably propose a Directive

268. FSB, OVERVIEW, supra note 247.
269. G-20, PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, supra note 246, at 9.
270. FSB, OVERVIEW, supra note 247, at 3. An international NGO, the International
Insolvency Institute, established a working group dedicated to promoting the development of
special insolvency regimes at international forums, such as the G-20. See http://www.iiiglobal.
org/about.
271. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLMENT, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE CROSS-BORDER BANK RESOLUTION GROUP (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/bcbs162.pdf?noframes=1.
272. See IMF & WORLD BANK, AN OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL, INSTITUTIONAL, AND
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR BANK INSOLVENCY (2009), available at http://www.imf.
org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/041709.pdf.
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eventually.273 The final report by the IMF and World Bank will also
include recommendations on how to achieve more consistency
among national bank insolvency laws.274
IV. CONCLUSION
As noted above, the United States and other governments have
responded to the financial crisis by proposing the broadest set of
regulatory reforms since the 1930s. These reforms generally propose
the creation of systemic risk regulatory bodies that would focus on
macro-prudential (as opposed to micro-prudential) supervision and
regulation, and include more robust laws for winding up, or
“resolving” systemically important financial institutions in ways that
are less disruptive to the financial system during economic panics
than traditional insolvency codes. They also generally call for greater
and more counter-cyclical capital, liquidity, and maximum leverage
requirements; regulation of executive compensation to reduce moral
hazard by requiring management to internalize the risks of their
choices; and increased regulation of over-the-counter derivatives.
The conventional wisdom is that by flooding the markets with
liquidity in response to this crisis, central banks and other
governmental bodies have avoided the mistakes of the 1930s. Time
will only tell whether these actions have truly been wise, or whether
they have merely planted the seeds for a more severe and
uncontrollable future economic calamity of the sort described in
ancient apocalyptic literature.275 There are two serious dangers in the
near term. If governments do not pull back the extraordinary
assistance to the markets soon enough, we could experience runaway
inflation that will be difficult to control. On the other hand, if
governments pull back too quickly, we could see another collapse in
asset prices and a double-dip recession. Because of political pressures
that favor safety over sacrifice, I believe the former risk is more likely.

273. Matthew Dalton, Europeans Review Bank Rules, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2009, at A10,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124757731423738667.html.
274. FSB, OVERVIEW, supra note 247.
275. For example, Chapter 18 of the Book of Revelation (or Apocalypse) predicts the
collapse in one day of a metaphorical City of Babylon, leaving the economic system in
shambles and the merchants of the world weeping and mourning over its collapse. Revelation
18: 2, 11–16.
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ANNEX A
FINANCIAL CRISIS LEGAL TIMELINE
Summer 2007

Spike in early delinquencies of recent subprime mortgages

Fall 2007

Tens of billions of MBS/CDO markdowns
FRB announces TSLF
Bear Stearns rescue
FRB announces PDCF, opening the discount window to investment banks

03/11

IndyMac fails
Housing and Economic Recovery Act becomes law

07/11
07/30

Winter/Spring 2008

03/14
03/16

VV

Summer 2008

September-October 2008

For a detailed timeline of
September 2008 – October 2008, see next page
AMEX approved as a BHC
FRB and Treasury announce restructuring of government assistance to AIG
Treasury abandons asset purchase program
Treasury, FRB and FDIC announce additional support to Citi
FRB announces TALF
FRB announces GSE purchase facility

11/10

November 1

11/12
11/23
11/25
11/26

December 1

Treasury announces automotive industry financing program
FRB approves GMAC as a BHC

12/19
12/24

Bush requests remaining $350 bn on behalf of Obama administration
Treasury, FRB and FDIC announce additional support to B of A

01/12
01/16

Geithner announces Financial Stability Plan
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act becomes law
Stress tests program announced
Treasury announces conversion of Citi investment in part to common stock

02/10
02/17
02/25
02/27

Treasury announces auto supplies support program
Treasury and FDIC announce PPIP

03/19
03/23

April 1 – May 1, 2009 : Congress in recess

FRB announces stress test results
TALF expanded to include legacy CMBS

05/07
05/19

GM files for Chapter 11
FDIC postpones Legacy Loans Program
10 large financial institutions approved to repay TARP
Treasury announces warrants repurchase guidelines

06/01
06/03
06/09
06/26

Treasury announces PPIP asset managers

07/08

January 1, 2009

February 1

March 1

April 1

May 1

June 1

July 1

August 1, 2009
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September 1, 2008

09/07

Fannie and Freddie placed into conservatorship; $200 bn earmarked
for capital injections

09/13

Bank of America purchases Merrill

09/17

Lehman files for Chapter 11
FRB authorizes $85 bn for AIG
SEC temporarily bans short selling of financial stocks

09/20
09/21

Treasury submits legislation for authority to purchase troubled assets
Goldman and Morgan Stanley approved as BHCs

09/25

WaMu fails; JPMorgan assumes deposit liabilities and acquires assets

09/29
09/30

House rejects Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
Dow falls 780 points

10/03

Emergency Economic Stabilization Act becomes law

10/07

FRB announces CPFF
FDIC raises deposit insurance to $250,000 per person per institution

09/16

October 1

10/12
10/14

November 1, 2008

500

FRB approves Wells Fargo / Wachovia merger
Treasury announces CPP
FDIC announces TLGP

10/21

FRB announces MMIFF

10/24

PNC purchases National City

10/28

Treasury purchases $125 bn in preferred stock in 9 US financial
institutions
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